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OPEN PRICE IN CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF
GOODS
By W'ILLIAm L. PROSSER

*

T is familiar economic doctrine' that the chief function of the

price term in a contract for the sale of goods is to shift, as
between the parties, the risks of a fluctuating market. A prospective seller, who owns a thousand bushels of. wheat, is necessarily subject to the risk that, before he sells, the market value of
the wheat will decline, and he will receive less for it than it is now
worth. A prospective buyer, who requires a thousand bushels of
wheat, is correspondingly subject to the risk that before he buys
the market will go up, and the wheat will cost him more than he
would now have to pay. When the two agree upon a contract for
the sale of the wheat at a price of one dollar per bushel, these
risks are exchanged. It is now the seller who assumes the risk
that the market will rise, and that he will have lost a profit; the
buyer who assumes the risk that the market will go down, and the
bargain prove to be a bad one. If the contract is for future delivery, the situation is the same, except that the seller doubtless
feels more acutely the hardship of delivering wheat at one dollar,
when its value has risen to one dollar and fifty cents, or the buyer
regrets more poignantly his bad judgment if the market has fallen
to fifty cents.
It frequently happens, however, that the parties to a contract
for the sale of goods are not willing to agree to this particular
exchange of risks. For sufficient reasons, they may desire to
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

'Well stated in Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales 1-6.
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enter into a binding agreement. The seller may wish to be assured of a market for his product, immediately or at some future
date, and yet be unwilling to risk a rising market after he has
sold. The buyer may want to be certain of a supply of goods, and
yet consider with reluctance the possibility of a decline. If delivery is to be in the future, both parties may be entirely uncertain as to what the price ought to be. The attempt to deal with
this problem, to make a binding agreement, and at the same time
to avoid or control this transfer of the risks of a changing market as between the parties, has led to a variety of business arrangements by which, in a contract for the sale of goods, the
price is left open for future determination.
Obviously there is nothing contrary to public policy in such
agreements. They are most commonly made when the market
is fluctuating violently, and future prices are most uncertain."
The number of open price contracts which have reached the
courts, and the uncharitable treatment which some of them have
received there, suggest an examination of the legal principles
involved, and an attempt to determine how far such practices
may be effective.
The principal legal obstacle to an open price contract is the
requirement of certainty. The price is an essential term of the
contract; without it there is no sufficient consideration for the
seller's promise, and no measure of the buyer's obligation to perform. It has been a settled rule, since the early civil law,4 that
2"Elements of uncertainty, whether with respect to the goods themselves, or with respect to outside matters affecting market conditions and
causing uncertainty or fluctuations in value may cause parties to desire
to make a deal but at the same time to leave open some range of future
adjustment. Shock absorbers in the form of open price or time or
quantity arrangements may be as important in practical business affairs
as are seat cushions and springs in motor vehicle transportation. Elasticity
of arrangement, if permissible, may serve to carry into effect many productive business operations where absolute rigidity of contract terms from
the outset would look so hazardous to one or the other party that the
transaction would not be undertaken." Void, Handbook of the Law of
Sales3 30.
Witness the large number of such cases appearing in the courts
the years 1915-1923.
during
4
The language of the Institutes was to the effect that, "Pretium autem
constitui oportet, nam nulla emtio sine pretio esse potest; sed et certum
pretium esse debet." Inst. 3, 23, 1. Justinian put an end to argument as
to whether the requirement of a certain price rendered invalid an
agreement that the price should be fixed by a third person, by a provision
in the Code, 4, 38, 15, that the sale was conditional on the valuation
being made: "Sin autem ille qui nominatus est, vel noluerit vel non potuerit
pretium definire, tunc pro nihilo esse venditionem quasi nullo pretio statuto.
nulla conjectura ... servanda utrum in personam certam, an in boni viri
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the price must be fixed with reasonable certainty. 5 But this rule
is subject to the qualification, which has caused endless confusion
arbitrium respicientes contrahentes ad haec pacta venerint."
The Code Napolion has adopted the same rules: By Article 1591,
"Le prix de la vente dolt itre determin6 et d~sign6 par les parties." By

Article 1592: "Il pent cependant itre laiss6 i l'arbitrage d'un tiers: si le
tiers ne veut ou ne peut faire 'estimation, il n'y a point de vente."
5
"It seems to be of the very essence of a sale that there should be a

fixed price for the purchase. The language of the civil law on this subject
is the language of common sense." Story, J., in Flagg v. Mann, (C.C. Mass.

1837) 2 Sumner 538, Fed. Cas. 4847.
"It is also essential to a valid sale or contract of sale that the parties
thereto, either expressly or impliedly, agree upon and fix with reasonable

certainty the price or consideration to be paid for the property sold, or

provide some method or criterion by which it can be definitely ascertained."
55 C. J. 68.
"To constitute a sale the price must be definitely fixed or the agreement
must contain such elements express or implied that the price can be ascertained therefrom. The price is one of the essential elements involved in
the agreement, and there must be an agreement of the parties to the price,
6ither express or implied, before there cn be a completion of the sale or
a binding
executory contract therefor." 23 R. C. L. sec. 94, p. 1277.
6
As an example, the decisions of the courts of New York speak for
themselves. Apparently it is the law of New York that:
(1) A promise to pay a "fair share" of the profits of a business
is too indefinite to be enforced. Varney v. Ditmars, (1916) 217 N. Y. 223,
111 N. E. 822; Bluemner v. Garvin, (1907) 120 App. Div. 29, 104 N. Y. S.
1009. (Contra, Noble v. Joseph Burnett Co., (1911) 208 Mass. 75, 94
N. E. 289). The same is true of a promise to pay a "reasonable amount"
out of such profits, Canet v. Smith, (1914) 86 Misc. Rep. 99, 149 N. Y. S.
101, or an "appropriate percentage."
Von Reitzenstein v. Tomlinson,
(1928) 249 N. Y. 60, 162 N. E. 584.
(2) A promise to pay one-half of "all profits and revenues" of an
exclusive selling agency, with no provision as to any obligations of the
selling agent, is sufficiently certain to be enforced. Wood Y. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, (1917) 222 N. Y. 88, 188 N. E. 214.
(3) A promise to furnish "good security," with no time limit set,
is sufficiently certain. Cowles v. Cole, (1930) 137 Misc. Rep. 491, 244
N. Y. S. 4.
(4) A promise to do work which shall be "satisfactory" to the adverse party is sufficiently definite. Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden,
(1886) 101 N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749.
(5) An agreement to sell land at a price to be agreed upon is too
indefinite to enforce. Ansorge v. Kane, (1927) 244 N. Y. 395, 155 N. E.
683.
(6) A contract for the sale of goods which is silent as to the price
fails for uncertainty. Lambert v. Hays, (1910) 136 App. Div. 574, 121
N. Y. S. 80.
(7) A contract for the sale of goods which is silent as to the time of
delivery is sufficiently certain. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co.,
(1887) 107 N. Y. 61.
(8) A contract for the sale of goods which gives the buyer the
privilege "to confirm more of the above if the seller can get more," with

nothing said as to either the price or the time limit, is sufficiently certain
to enforce. Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co., (1921) 232 N. Y. 112, 133
N. E. 370.
(9)
A contract to supply "30,000 to 40,000 tons" is sufficiently definite.
De Grasse Paper Co. v. Northern New York Coal Co., (1919) 190 App.
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in contract decisions, that in certain ill-defined situations 7 the
court will remove all uncertainty by supplying an implication that
the parties agree to do what is reasonable. The court insists that
it cannot make a contract for the parties, s but it sometimes is
willing to read into the agreement they have made a provision
which is not visibly there. The problem of certainty is very
largely a problem of whether the court will make the contract
certain where the parties have not done so.
Opposed to this requirement of certainty is the obvious fact
that in all open price contracts there is an intention to make a
deal. The agreement is made by business men; it is meant to
accomplish something.9 It is not to be supposed that they have
Div. 227, 179 N. Y. S. 788.
(10) A contract to furnish a news service at "a sum not exceeding
$300 a week" is too uncertain. United Press v. New York Press Co.,
(1900) 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527.
(11)
A contract to supply paper, "the price of the paper and the
length of time for which such price shall apply to be agreed upon," with a
definite maximum stated, fails for uncertainty, not because the price is
1-4" open, but because the time for which it is to apply is left open. Sun
Pr.nting & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., (1923) 235 N. Y.
338. 139 N. E. 470.
If there is any silver thread of consistency running through these
decisions,
it has escaped the observation of the writer.
7
1n this connection, Professor Williston's review of "Offers and agreements indefinite as to price" is of interest:
"It is by no means uncommon for those who offer or agree to employ
others, or to buy goods, to make no statement as to the wages or price
to be paid. The law invokes here (as likewise where an agreement is
indefinite as to time) the standard of reasonableness. Accordingly the
fair value of the services or property is recoverable. Sometimes, however,
the terms of a promise exclude the supposition that the reasonable or
market price was intended. In such a case no contract can arise. Thus a
promise may attempt to define the price, but do so too indefinitely for enforcement, as by such words as 'Not exceeding $300 a week,' the cost plus
a 'nice' profit, a division of profits 'upon a very liberal basis,' 'a reasonable
amount from the profits,' 'a portion' of the promisor's estate, 'a part of
the money,' 'to reduce the rent,' 'a due allowance,' 'money to enable them
to carry on their business,' 'good wages,' 'the average price.' These have
been held too indefinite for enforcement." 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 41,
p. 67.
It is at least arguable that there is no very visible reason why, in the
illustrations given, there is any less ground to imply an agreement to do
what is reasonable than where the parties have said nothing at all. If the
contract says nothing, we invoke "the standard of reasonableness" and
enforce it. If it attempts rather vaguely to suggest such a standard, we
say 8that it fails for uncertainty.
"There is need, it is true, of no high degree of ingenuity to show how
the parties, with little change of language, could have framed a form of
contract to which obligation would attach. The difficulty is that they
framed another. We are not at liberty to revise while professing to construe." Cardozo, 3., in Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper &
Power Co., (1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470.
9
"This option was drawn by merchants. We are persuaded that mer-
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gone through the motions of making a contract with the intention that it shall be of no effect." Neither is it to be presumed
that either party intends anything unreasonable. The fact that
some pains have been taken to make a contract, where the price
cannot be fixed, indicates that considerable importance is attached
to the terms upon which there has in fact been agreement. If
the court, by invoking the "standard of reasonableness,"" can give
effect to these terms, there is every reason why it should do so.
Furthermore, where the price is the term left open, we have a
reasonable, readily ascertainable objective standard to which the
contract may be referred-namely, the current market price of
the goods at the time and place of performance named in the
contract. This is the standard to which we are accustomed to
refer in measuring damages when the contract is broken, by fail3
2
ure of the seller to deliver, or refusal of the buyer to accept.
In determining the damages we deal with every difficulty which
may arise in the application of such a standard. 1 If the court
chants reading it would
not be doubtful of its meaning. It was meant to
accomplish something! ' Cardozo, J., in Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co.,
(1921)0 232 N. Y. 112, 133 N. E. 370.
' "In the transactions of business life, sanity of end and aim is at
least a presumption, albeit subject to be rebutted. The defendant, like
the plaintiff, supposed that in signing these documents it was doing something understood to be significant and serious. It not only accepted the
the plaintiff's order, but it asked the plaintiff to confirm the terms of the
acceptance, and followed this with a cable of the order to its manufacurer
abroad. Was it all sound and fury, signifying nothing?" Cardozo, C. J.,
in Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, (1930) 254 N. Y. 179, 172
N. E. 463.
"Professor Williston's phrase. See footnote 7.
122 Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed., sec. 734, p. 1530; 2 Wiliston, Sales,
2d ed., sec. 599, p. 147. The following measure of damages is adopted by
the Uniform Sales Act, sec. 67 (3), Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8441 (3):
"Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the
measure of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damages of a greater amount, is the difference between the
contract price and the market or currert price of the goods at the time
or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed,
then at the time of the refusal to deliver."
132 Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed., see. 753, p. 1570; 2 Williston, Sales,
2d ed., sec. 582, p. 1434. The measure of damages adopted by the Uniform
Sales Act, sec. 64 (3), Mason's 1927 Mium. Stat., sec. 8438 (3), is as follows:
"Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the
measure of damages is, in the absence of special circumstances, showing
proximate damage of a greater amount, the difference between the contract
price and the market or current price at the time or times when the goods
ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then
at the time of the refusal to accept"
"4See 2 Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed., see. 739, p. 1545, and sec. 753, p.
1574; 2 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 583, p. 1437, and sec. 599, p. 1481, for
a discussion of the situation where there is no market for the goods, or the
market price is controlled and does not fairly represent their value.
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is to imply an agreement to pay a reasonable price, then this is
our reasonable price, for we cannot assume that it is intended that
the buyer should pay more than the fair market value of the
goods when he receives them, or that the seller should accept less.
With these considerations in mind, we may attempt to review 1"
the methods by which the price may be left open, and the treatment which each has received from the courts.
1.

THE CONTRACT SILENT AS TO THE PRICE

The simplest way to leave the price open is to say nothing
about it. Where this occurs, there is the greatest uncertainty as
to what the parties may have intended. There are numerous possibilities, among them the following:
(1) The parties may have forgotten entirely to agree upon
a price.
(2) They may have intended that the price should be fixed
by agreement at some future date, and that until such agreement
the contract should not be effective.
(3)
The buyer may have intended to pay any price up to a
certain maximum, the seller to accept anything above a certain
minimum.
(4) They may have intended that the price should be determined by some external standard, not expressed in the contract.
(5) They may have intended the market price at the time
the contract was made.
(6) They may have intended the market price at the time
of delivery.
There is nothing to indicate which of these possibilities, or
others, was in fact intended. All appear to be about equally probable. If the parties intended (1), (2), or (3), then there has
been no expression of mutual assent, and no contract. If it
should be (4), we encounter difficulties of proof, such as the
parol evidence rule. As between (5) and (6), the choice is between an agreement which shifts the risks of the market at the
time it is made, and one which defers the exchange of risks until
the goods are to be transferred. In this situation, where the
contract is most indefinite, and there is least indication of what
was actually intended, the courts have proceeded quite uniformly
to enforce the contract at a "reasonable price."
15The best discussion of these cases is found in Llewellyn, Cases and
Materials on the Law of Sales 1-37, and in a note in (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev.
708. See also the annotation, 53 L. R. A. 288.
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The earliest cases involved only the sufficiency of a written
memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds. It was first decided16 that if a price was agreed upon in an oral contract, a memorandum of the contract would not satisfy the statute unless it stated the price, since "the price agreed to be paid constitutes a material part of the bargain"--a decision which has since been followed
almost without dispute. 17 In Acebal v.Lezvy, 8 the court then considered 9 the rule to be applied where no price is named in the oral
agreement. While expressing its doubts on the question where the
contract is still executory, 20 it concluded that where the goods
have been delivered, the memorandum need not name a price if
none has been agreed, since the law will imply an agreement to
pay a reasonable price. It is clear that the court regarded this
implication as quasi-contractual, and not as implied in fact.'
Three months later, in Hoadly v. M'Laine,'" the same court
considered an executory contract for the sale of a carriage, where
neither the oral agreement nor the memorandum mentioned the
price. Without referring to its previous doubts, the court held
the memorandum sufficient, saying that where no price is fixed
by the contract the law will imply an agreement to pay a reasonable price.2 3 It is possible that the decision may have been influ16Elmore v. Kingscote, (1826) 5 B. & C. 583.
"7Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., sec. 376, p. 511; 1 Williston,
Sales, 2d ed., sec. 103, p. 186; Hanson v. Marsh, (1888) 40 Minn. 1, 40
N. W. 841. The cases are collected in annotations in 30 A. L. R. 1163,
and 59 A. L. R. 1422.
18(1834) 10 Bing. 376, 3 L. J. C. P. 98.
' 9This was dictum. The declaration pleaded a special contract for the
sale of nuts, at "the then usual and common shipping price for nuts, at the
port of Gijon, in the kingdom of Spain." The holding of the case %-as
that a memorandum which said nothing about the price would not support
the declaration. The court followed Elmore v. Kingscote, (1826) 5
B. &20C. 583.
'Whether in all cases of an executory contract of purchase and sale,
where the parties are altogether silent as to the price, the law will supply
the want of any agreement as to price, by inferring that the parties must
have intended to sell and buy at a reasonable price. may be a uuestion of

some difficulty." Acebal v. Levy, (1834) 10 Bing. 376, 382, 3 E . C. P. 98.
2""Undoubtedly the law makes that inference where the contract is
executed by the acceptance of the goods by the Defendants, in order to

prevent the injustice of the Defendant taking the goods without paying for

them ... But it may be questionable whether the same reason applied to a
case where the contract is execuiory only, and where the goods are still in
the possession, or under the control, of the seller." Acebal v. Levy, (1834)
10 Bing. 376, 382, 3 L. J.C. P. 98.
22(1834) 10 Bing. 482, 3 L. J. C. P. 162.
2'-it is clear that a contract for the sale of a commodity, in which the

price is left uncertain, is, in law. a contract for what the goods shall be
found to be reasonably worth. [Citing, from BI. Com., b. 2, c. 30, a passage
which seems to be concerned- chiefly with quasi-contract] . . . . What is
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enced by the court's reluctance to enforce the statute of frauds, 2 '
but it appears more probable that it was consciously extending the
"implied promise" of quasi-contract to cover, in this situation, an
executory agreement.2 5 Subsequent English Law has approved
the result.2"
The ruie established by these cases 27 is followed wherever the
contract says nothing about the price. If the sale has been executed, by transfer of the property, the buyer is obligated to pay a
reasonable price. 28 Occasionally it is said2 9 that this obligation is
implied by law is as strong to bind the parties as if it were under their
bond. This is a contract in which the parties are silent as to price, and
therefore leave it to the law to ascertain what the commodity contracted
for is really, worth." Hoadly v. M'Laine, (1834) 10 Bing. 482, 487,
3 L.2 J. C. P. 162.
'It is suggested by the annotator in 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 429, 433, that
the court merely had in mind the question of the sufficiency of the memorandum to comply with the statute, and not the question as to the essential
terms of the contract itself. The language quoted in footnote 23 certainly
does not give this impression. Cf. also the New York court's interpretation
of the case in United Press v. New York Press Co., (1900) 164 N. Y.
406, 25
58 N. E. 527.
See footnote 23. Note also the statement of Park, J.that, "Putting
the two writings together, it is impossible to say he did not undertake to
pay 2on a quantum meruit."
GAshcroft v. Morrin, (1842) 4 Man. & G. 450, 11 L. J. C. P. 265

("The order here is to send certain quantities of porter and other malt
liquor, on 'moderate terms.' Why is not that sufficient? That is the
contract between the parties") ; see Valpy v. Gibson, (1847) 4 C. B. 837,
6 L. J.C. P. 241. The rule is now incorporated in the Sale of Goods Act,
sec 8.27
Stated as follows in Benjamin, Sales, 7th ed., p. 272: "The rule of
law, then, is that where there is no actual agreement as to price, the note
of the bargain is sufficient, even though silent as to the price, because the
law supplies the deficiency by importing into the bargain a promise by the
buyer to pay a reasonable price. But the law only does this in the absence
of an agreement, and therefore, where the price is fixed by mutual consent,
that price is part of the bargain, and must be shown in writing; and parol
evidence is admissible to show that a price was actually agreed upon, in
order to establish the insuffiiciency of a memorandum which is silent as
to price."

Hence the anomaly of a rule which permits the defendant to defeat
the contract, under a statute intended to prevent "frauds and perjuries," by
introducing evidence that he did in fact make a contract and agree upon
a price. The rule is well settled. See the notes in 30 A. L R. 1163, and
59 A.28 L. R. 1422.
Jenkins v. Richardson, (1831)

6 J. J.Marsh. (Ky.)

441, 22 Am.

Dec. 82; Taft v. Travis, (1883) 136 Mass. 95; Comstock v. Sanger, (1883)
51 Mich. 498, 16 N. W. 872; Peerless Glass Co. v. Pacific Crockery Co.,
(1898) 121 Cal. 641, 54 Pac. 101; Leist v. Dierssen, (1906) 4 Cal. App.
634, 88 Pac. 812; Smith v. State, (1911)

9 Ga. App. 227, 70 S. E. 969;

Wilkins v. Jackson, (1924) 100 Okla. 143, 227 Pac. 882; Dickerman v.
Ohashi Importing Co., (1923)

63 Cal. App. 101, 218 Pac. 458; Standard

Coal Co. v. Stewart, (1928) 72 Utah 272, 269 Pac. 1014. See also James v.
Muir, (1876) 33 Mich. 223, and Stout v. Caruthersville Hardware Co.,
(1908) 131 Mo. App. 520, 110 S.W. 619. The same rule applies where
a price is actually fixed, but for any reason ihe agreement as to the price
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in quasi-contract; but the same agreement is implied, and the
contract is enforced, where it is still executory. 0 If the buyer
accepts and retains the goods with knowledge that he is expected
to pay a particular price, he may be taken to have assented to that
price;1 but in the absence of such special circumstances, he is
required to pay a reasonable price. This rule is now incorporated
32
in the Uniform Sales Act.
fails.

Bradley v. Rea. (1869)

291

14 Allen (Mass.) 188, 4 Am. Rep. 524.

Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 171, p. 318; Albemarle Lumber Co. v.

(1890) 105 N. C.34, 10 S. E. 871.
Wilcox,
30
Burlington Grocery Co. v. Lines, (1923) 96 Vt. 405, 120 Ati. 169;
S. F. Bowser & Co. v. F. K. Marks & Co., (1910) 96 Ark. 113, 131 S. W.
334, Ann. Cas. 1912B 357 and note, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 429 and note;
Prenatt v. Runyon, (1859) 12 Ind. 174; H. T. Cottam & Co. v. Moises,
(1921) 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916; see Reid v. Diamond Plate Glass Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1898) 85 Fed. 193; Hanson v. Marsh, (1888) 40 Minn. 1,
40 N. W. 841; Cameron v. Tompkins, (1893) 72 Hun 113, 25 N. Y. S. 305;
James v. Muir, (1876) 33 Mich. 223; Stapleton v. Muscogee Guano Co.,
(1922) 29 Ga. App. 199, 114 S. E. 906. Cf. Burger v. Ray (Tem. Civ.
App. 1922) 239 S. W. 257 (contract to thresh grain). Other cases involving contracts for services where no price is mentioned are collected
in 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 41, p. 67.
To the contrary is Lambert v. Hays, (1910) 136 App. Div. 574, 121

N Y. S.80, which seems to have been overruled by sec. 9 of the Uniform

Sales Act (see footnote 32), enacted in New York in 1911; also McNeely
v. Bookmyer, (1928) 292 Pa. 12, 140 Atl. 542 (sale of corporate stock;
as to whether the Uniform Sales Act applies to such sales, see (1931) 44
Harv. L. Rev. 998). Also a few cases involving options for the purchase
of land. See Fogg v. Price, (1888) 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741; Folsom
v. Harr, (1905) 218 Ill. 369, 75 N. E. 987; Wolf v. Lodge, (1913) 159
Iowa 162, 140 N. W. 429; Nichols v. Coppock, (1927) 124 Kan. 652, 261
Pac. 574.

In Long Syrup Refining Co. v. Corn Products Ref'g Co., (C.C.A.

9th Cir. 1912) 193 Fed. 929, the offeror expressly stated that it "made no
condition relative to competitive prices or otherwise." The court regarded
this as a disclaimer of any intention to be bound at a reasonable price, and
held 3the contract ineffective.
'California Prune & Apricot Growers v. El Reno Whole. Groc. Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 839: D. S. Cage Co. v. Black. (1911)
97 Ark. 613, 134 S.W. 942; Ross Meehan Foundries v. Nashville Bridge
Co., (1924) 149 Tenn. 693, 261 S. W. 674; Caskey v. Williams Bros.,
(Ky. App. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 991; West v. L. W. Sweet. (Tem. Civ.
App. 1927) 292 S.W. 251; but see Duvall v.Ferwerda, (1906) 146 Mich.
13, 108 S. W. 1115 (acceptance of inferior grade of goods ordered). See
also the annotation in 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 254, on acceptance of the chattel
as assent to the seller's price, and 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 368, as to the effect
of retention
of the goods after notice of mistake in the quoted price.
32
Section 9, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8384:
"(1) The price may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be
fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be determined by the
course of dealing between the parties.
(4) Where the price is n9t determined in accordance with the foregoing provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each
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In determining what is a reasonable price, 3 the courts have
resorted to the familiar quantum meruit measure of the market
price of the goods at the time and place fixed by the contract for
their delivery. 4 In other words, we have adopted a standard
which defers the shifting of market risks until it coincides with
the actual transfer of the property. The risk of a decline in the
market value does not pass to the buyer until he becomes the
owner. But it was recognized from the outset that the standard
cannot be inflexible. A reasonable price
"may or may not agree with the current price of the commodity
at the port of shipment at the precise time when such shipment is
made. The current pr:ice of the day may be highly unreasonable
from accidental circumstances, as on account of the commodity
having been purposely kept back by the vendor himself, or with
reference to the price at other
ports in the immediate vicinity, or
35
from various other causes.
If there is no market, or if the market is monopolized, or for
any other reason the market price is fictitious and unfair, the
court does not hesitate to ignore it, and to take other evidence30
particular case."
In Boyd v. Second-hand Supply Co., (1912) 14 Ariz. 36, 123 Pac. 619,
the court said that under this section, in order to make an indivisible contract binding, the gross price, or any price, need not be stated in the contract.
The California Civil Code, sec. 1611, provides: "When a contract
does not determine the amount of the consideration, nor the method by
which it is to be ascertained .

. .

. the consideration must be so much

money as the object of the contract is reasonably worth." This appears
to have been interpreted in Dickerman v. Ohashi Importing Co., (1923)
63 Cal. App. 101, 218 Pac. 458, to mean that an executory contract could
be enforced
at a reasonable price.
33
See 1 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 172, p. 319, for a discussion of
the meaning
of this phrase.
34
Henckley v. Hendrickson, (C.C. Ohio 1850) 5 McLean 170. Fed.
Cas. 6348; Taft v. Travis, (1883) 136 Mass. 95; Deck v. Feld, (1890) 38
Mo. App. 674; Althouse v. Alvord, (1871) 28 Wis. 577 (evidence of cost
not material where there is a market price); MeEwen v. Morey, (1871)
60 Ill. 32; Wilkins v. Jackson, (1924) 100 Okla. 143, 227 Pac. 882; see
Whitcomb v. Boston Dairy Co., (1914) 218 Mass. 24, 105 N. E. 554.
35 Acebal v. Levy, (1834) 10 Bing. 376, 3 L. J. C. P. 98. See also
James6 v. Muir, (1876) 33 Mich. 223.
3 1n Kountz v. Kirkpatrick, (1872) 72 Pa. St. 376, 13 Am. Rep. 687,
the court said that an unnaturally inflated market price was not always
evidence of actual value, and that the jury could determine from the
market price before and after the particular date, and from other sources of
information, the "actual market value." In Lovejoy v. Michels, (1891),
88 Mich. 15, 49 N. W. 901, 13 L. R. A. 770, Champlin, J. said that where
there was no fair market value of manufactured goods, because the
market was controlled, evidence to establish reasonable value must necessarily be the cost of production, including the cost of labor and materials,
and a reasonable profit. Cf. Murray v. Stanton, (1868) 99 Mass. 345,
where there was no market for railway bonds because there were no sales,
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as to the reasonable value of the goods. The judgment of the jury
is substituted for the agreement which the parties have not made.
In effect, they are made to agree that they will come together on a
price, or accept whatever may be found in court to be reasonable.
In the ordinary case, the adoption of the market price at the
time of performance as a "reasonable price" results merely in
nominal damages for breach of the contract." The measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price and the
market price,38 and if the two are the same, there can be no substantial recovery. It is only where there are special circumstances
within the contemplation of the parties, such as the loss of a resale,
or a particular use for the goods, that there may be consequential
But it is precisely where such special circumstances
damages.
are contemplated that the parties have most reason to make a
binding agreement for the sale of the goods, where they cannot
fix a price.
If the court will supply a reasonable intent where the contract has been left most uncertain by saying nothing, it might
reasonably be supposed that the same course would be followed
when by express provision the price is left open. This is not
always the case.
2.

PRICE TO BE AGREED.

The contract may provide that the price shall be fixed by agreement of the parties at a future date. The purpose of such a provision of course is to delay the exchange of risks until both parties
have more information as to future market prices. In the meantime, so far as they are able, they obviously intend to make a
contract.
Our traditional attitude4 1 toward an agreement of this kind is
that it is illusory, and must fail. We say that the buyer promises
to pay only what he shall agree to pay, and this means that he will
pay only what he chooses, for he need agree to nothing that he
does not choose. 41 Consequently his promise is not sufficient conand evidence of the condition of the railroad was held admissible. See
also cases cited in footnotes 97 to 102 inclusive.
3
-See Wire v. Foster, (1883) 62 Iowa 114, 17 N. W. 174; Hill v.
McKay, (1892) 94 Cal. 5, 29 Pac. 406; Indiana Tie Co. v. Phelps, (Ky. App.
1910) 124 S. W. 833.
3sSee footnotes 12 and 13.
392 Sedgwick. Damages, 9th ed., secs. 742, 742a; 2 Williston, Sales, 2d
ed., sec.
599a-599d.
40Benjamin, Sales, 7th ed., 159; 1 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sees.

168.
167, 41

This argument is well stated in Livingston Waterworks v. City of

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

sideration, and there is no contract. If the parties subsequently
agree upon a price, it may be enforced,4 2 otherwise not.
The earliest cases4 3 dealt with contracts for services in which
compensation was left entirely to the employer. At one time it
was held," even in this situation, that there was a promise implied
in the contract to pay a reasonable amount; but the dissenting
opinion of Baron Parke 41 ultimately prevailed,"0 to the effect
that there was no such obligation. 7 Following these decisions,
it is generally held that a contract for the sale of goods at a price
left to future agreement is not binding unless the parties later
agree.
48
If the goods are delivered to the buyer, title may pass to him,
notwithstanding the failure of the contract, and he may be required to pay a reasonable price ;49 but the obligation is quasiLivingston, (1916) 53 Mont. 1, 162 Pac. 381: "An agreement to renew on
terms to be agreed upon is simply not enforceable, because the court cannot
compel the parties to agree nor make an agreement for them; but tile
uncertain terms can be made certain by agreement of the parties, and, if
they choose to agree, the difficulty is surmounted and the agreement is
complete. In such a case no need exists for thrusting into the contract
a condition not expressed by the parties, nor-in our judgment-implied
by them, since they reserve to themselves the right to bargain; and the
right to bargain means the right to negotiate for and settle upon terms
which a court might or might not consider entirely 'fair and equitable.'
Any other conclusion vests with courts the power to make contracts for
parties in every instance."
42Speirs v. Union Drop Forge Co., (1899) 174 Mass. 175, 54 N. E. 497,
180 Mass. 87, 61 N. E. 825. Apparently parol evidence is admissible to
show such an agreement. See Becher v. National Cloak & Suit Co., (1908)
128 App. Div. 423, 112 N. Y. S.439.
4"Taylor v. Brewer, (1813) 1 M. & S. 290 ("such remuneration shall
be made as shall be deemed right" [by the employer]) ; Bryant v. Flight,
(1839) 5 M. & W. 114 ("the amount of payment I am to receive I leave
entirely to you") ; Roberts v. Smith, (1859) 28 L. J. Ex. 164 ("any remuneration for my time and labor you may think me deservinz of").
44By the majority in Bryant v. Flight, (1839) 5 M. & W. 114. Cf.
Jewry v. Bush, (1814) 5 Taunt. 302. See also Hyderabad Co. v. Willoughby, [1899] 2 Q. B. 530 (insurance premium "to be hereafter arranged").
45In Bryant v. Flight, (1839) 5 M. & W. 114: "1 own my impression
is, that it amounts to a mere honorary obligation on the part of the defendant; and I cannot distinguish this case from that of Taylor v. Brewer."
46It was approved on the facts in Roberts v. Smith, (1859) 28 L. J.
Ex. 164, the court distinguishing Bryant v. Flight, (1839) 5 M. & W. 114,
where
a distinction obviously was impossible. See footnote 43.
47
Apparently it was not definitely decided until 1902 in England that an
agreement for a price "to be mutually arranged between us" was ineffective.
Loftus v. Roberts, (1902) 18 T. L. R. 532.
48 Williston, Sales, 2d. ed., sec. 167, p. 310. See also the cases cited
in footnote 49. Early cases in Michigan and North Carolina disputed
even this obvious proposition. Foster v. Lumbermen's Mining Co.. (1888)
68 Mich. 188, 36 N. W. 171: Wittkowskv v. Wasson. (1874) 71 N. C. 451.
49Valpy v. Gibson, (1847) 4 C. B. 837, 6 L. J.C. P. 241; McEwen v.
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contractual, rather than in contract. ° The executory contract
cannot be enforced by either party." The same rule is followed
where the terms of payment 2 or the security " are left to be
agreed, and in the analogous situation of a lease containing a
provision for renewal at a rent to be agreed. 5 '
The basic assumption of these decisions would seem to be
that the parties are expressly reserving to themselves the right
to do something unreasonable. The buyer reserves the right to
agree only to a price so low that the seller, as a reasonable man,
could not accept it; the seller, the right to accept only a price
so high that the buyer could not reasonably pay. If nothing were
said about the price, the law would imply an intention to fix a
reasonable one. The effect of the provision that the price is
to be agreed is to negative this intention.
The soundness of this assumption may perhaps be questioned.
The parties have made what purports to be a binding contract.
The buyer intends to buy the goods, for that is his agreement.
The normal inference would be that he intends to pay their
reasonable value. If the provision were that the price should be
"satisfactoi-y" to either party, the law might require him to act
Morey, (1871) 60 IlL 32; United States v. Wilkins, (1821) 6 Wheat.
(U.S.) 134; Shealy and Finn v. Edwards, (1882) 73 Ala. 175, 49 Am.
Rep. 43; Greene v. Lewis, (1888) 85 Ala. 221, 4 So. 740, 7 Am. St. Rep.
42; Hanson v. Knutson Hardware Co., (1924) 182 Wis. 459, 196 N. W.
831. See also Leist v. Dierssen, (1906) 4 Cal. App. 634, 88 Pac. 812;
Stout v. Caruthersville Hardware Co., (1908) 131 Mo. App. 520, 110
S. W. 619.
501 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 167, p. 312.
5
Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co.,
(1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470; Elmore, Quilliam & Co. v. Parish,
(1911) 170 Ala. 499, 54 So. 203; Van Meeuwen v. Swanson, (1913) 121
Minn. 250, 141 N. W. 112; Jules Levy & Bro. v. A. Mautz & Co., (1911)
16 Cal. App. 666, 117 Pac. 936; Booth v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., (1913) 21
Cal. App. 427, 131 Pac. 1062; Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., (C.C.A.
10th Cir. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 385; Dayton v. Stone, (1896) 111 Mich. 196.
69 N. W. 515; Watts v. Weston, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1894) 62 Fed. 136. See
also Livingston Waterworks v. City of Livingston, (1916) 53 Mont. 1,
162 Pac. 381; D. S. Cage Co. v. Black, (1911) 97 Ark. 613, 134 S. W. 942;
Summit Lumbev Co. v. Sheppard, (1912) 102 Ark. 88, 143 S. W. 100;

Bigger v. Johnson, (1912) 106 Ark. 89, 152 S. W. 291. Cf. Guann v.

Newcomb, (1891) 82 Iowa 468, 48 N. 'V. 989, where the court construed
an agreement to pay the "inventory price of the goods at the time said

stock is to be invoiced" as requiring a supplemental agreement. Also
Schreiner v. Shanahan, (1921) 105 Neb. 525, 181 N. W. 536 ("the best
price52obtainable").
Monahan v. Alien, (1913) 47 Mont. 75, 130 Pac. 768.
5
3Williams v. Stewart, (1879) 25 Minn. 575; Leslie v. Mathwig, (1915)
131 Minn. 159, 154 N. W. 941. The cases are collected in a note in 49
A. L.54R. 1464.
Cases are collected in a note in 30 A. L. R. 572.
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reasonably."
Unless the contract makes it clear that it is not
intended to be binding until the price is agreed,50 or such a meaning is attached by business usage to the particular terms used,sT
why is it not to be implied, when the parties agree to agree upon a
price, that they are to agree upon a reasonable one? Cases in
which other terms of the contract, such as the quantity of the
8
goods or the time of delivery, are left to be agreed" are not
exactly analogous, since in the case of the price term there is a
definite objective standard to which the contract may be referred.
Ordinarily there is no such thing as a standard market quantity,
or a standard time for delivery, but there is a current market
price, which must at least have been within the contemplation of
the parties. Their intention primarily is to make a deal, and the
price is a subsidiary matter; why should we defeat the real object
of the transaction for the sake of an item which they consider of
secondary importance?
A few cases,60 including a decision of
"',1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 44, pp. 74-76. See also 12 M1NNEso'rA
LAW50REvIgw 411.
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper Co., (1923) 235
N. Y. 30, 138 N. E. 495 (price for the balance of the year to be arranged
by mutual consent; if the parties fail to arrange a price, the contract to
terminate).
7
5 1n some industries, such as the sale of canned foods, it is customary
to sell "S. A. P." . . .subject to approval of price when named by the
seller. These contracts are regarded as options under which the buyers may
later purchase stated quantities of goods if the price is satisfactory. Converse, Marketing Methods and Policies, p. 573, says that the reason for
making contracts of this kind is that the banks are unwilling to advance
money for the season's operations unless the canners can show that they
have agreements for the sale of a large part of their packs; and that buyers
sometimes object to this method of naming prices, claiming thdft it allows
the sellers to name high prices which the buyers practically have to accept,
since58few canners will sell below the opening prices.
See cases cited in 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 45, p. 78.
59Cf. Spiritusfabriek Astra v. Sugar Products Co., (1917) 176 App.
Div. 829, 163 N. Y. S. 516, where the contract was for the delivery of
6,000 to 12,000 tons of molasses, "buyer's option," to be delivered within
three years at times to be arranged between buyer and seller. The contract
was held enforceable, as an agreement "to do what the law would require to be done in case the clause was absent from the contract, that
is, to00deliver within a reasonable time after demand."
In Abrams v. George E. Keith Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d)
90, the seller agreed to sell and deliver shoes to the buyer "at such prices
as might be agreed from time to time." A counterclaim for breach of
this contract was ordered stricken. The order was reversed, the court
saying: "This contract was perfectly good in law. Being indefinite as
to its terms, either party might terminate it upon reasonable notice. No
such notice was given here. If the facts were as the counterclaim avers,
plaintiff was gfilty of breach of the cbntract." See comments on this case
in Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, 19.
In Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., (C.C. Mo.
1886) 29 Fed. 546, the suit was for specific performance of an agreement
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the Supreme Court of the United States,"' have followed this line
of reasoning, and have held such contracts to be valid, but they
62
are very much in the minority.
The curiously ambiguous language of section 9 of the Uniform Sales Act, 63 which deals with open price contracts, sheds
no particular light upon the rule to be followed in these cases.
The section provides:
"(1) The price may be fixed in the contract, or may be left to
be fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be determined by the course of dealings between the parties.
to permit the use of a right of way "under such reasonable regulations
and terms as may be agreed upon." The court held the contract valid,
saying: "The stipulation provided for use under such reasonable terms
and regulations, and for such reasonable compensation as should be agreed
upon. It cannot be that the mere whim and caprice of the one party-a
blind refusal to come to any agreement--can, nullify the entire force of
the stipulation. It would make the right of the interveners a mere barren
right. It would nullify the entire stipulation, and operate simply to give
the respondents that which without it they had-the privilege of permitting
other roads to enter. It would be mockery to call such a provision a
stipulation for a right"
In Young v. Nelson, (1922) 121 Wash. 285, 209, Pac. 515, the court
granted specific performance of an agreement to renew a lease at such
rental "as may be agreed upon." This was regarded as the equivalent of a
provision for-a price "satisfactory" to both parties, which would require
a reasonable
rental. See the discussion of this case in 30 A. L. R. 572.
6
oUnited States v. Swift & Co., (1926) 270 U. S. 124, 46 Sup. Ct.
308, 70 L. Ed. 497. This case involved a claim for he government's refusal to accept deliveries of meat under a contract, by the terms of which
prices were to be determined by agreement at or near the first of each
month, for the product to be furnished during that month. Under the
regulations of the Food Administration, the seller's profit could not exceed
9% of its investment, or 22% of its gross sales. The court held the
contract enforceable. Concerning the open price, Taft, C. J. said briefly:
"Under ordinary conditions, a valid agreement can be made for purchase
and sale without the fixing of a special price. In such a cabe a reasonable
price is presumed to have been intended. . . . We find, therefore, that,
by the writings and documents, all the necessary details making a valid
contract were set forth in writing."
In the ordinary case, enforcement of the contract at a "reasonable
price" would result merely in nominal damages for breach. Smith v.
Loag, (1890) 132 Pa. St. 301, 19 Atl. 137; see also cases cited in footnote 37. But in the extraordinary cases, where the usual measure of
damages is inapplicable, it becomes of importance whether the contract is
to be held binding. In United States v. Swift & Co., supra, the evidence
showed that the seller could not resell the meat without affecting the
market, and causing serious loss both to itself and to the government.
The court said that: "Under these conditions, there was no standard by
which the usual rule of damages, namely, the difference between the contract price and the market price, could be the measure of Swift & Company's loss through the failure of the government to receive the bacon.
This was a case where the only standard could be the contract price and
the amount realized at actual sale by diligent effort"
62See cases cited in footnote 51.
63Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8384.
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"(4) Where the price is not determined in accordance with
the foregoing provisions, the buyer must pay a reasonable price.
What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the
circumstances of each particular case."
There is little reason to doubt that the Commissioners who drew
this section intended it to state the common law rule.0 ' But the
wording is certainly open to a different interpretation. What is
meant, in (1), by "may be left to be fixed in such manner as may
be agreed?"" Agreed in the contract, or subsequently agreed by
the parties? And what is meant in (4) by "determined in accordance with the foregoing provisions?"
Does this mean
that the price may be left to be fixed by agreement, and that if
it is not so "determined"-that is, if the parties ultimately do not
agree-the buyer must pay a reasonable price? Does it mean that
wherever the price is not (a) fixed by the contract, or (b) left to
be fixed-in an objective manner definitely agreed by the parties,
or (c) determined by the course of dealing-then the reasonable
price is to be paid? It is astonishing, after twenty-five years of
the Sales Act, with innumerable open price conti'acts before the
courts, to find no satisfactory construction of this section. In the
one case in which such construction has been attempted, the supreme court of Ohio used language which is quite as ambiguous
as the statute itself.08
"4Professor Williston's interpretation is set forth in 1 Williston, Sales,

2d ed., secs. 167, 168, pp. 309-314. The language quoted in the text is
taken substantially from sec. 8 of the English Sale of Goods Act. 1
Uniform Laws Annotated 51. In Solter v. Leedom & Worrell Co.,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1918) 252 Fed. 133, the court said that subdivision (1)
of this section was "a formulated statement of the recognized rule."
65Section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act reads "may be left to be fixed in
manner thereby agreed." Professor Williston explains that the wording
of the American Act was substituted, in order that the manner of fixing
the price need not be named "thereby"--that is, by the contract. See 1
Williston, Sales, 2d ed., pp. 308, 309.
66Domhoff & Joyce Co. v. Hamilton Furnace Co., (1923) 108 Ohio
St. 25, 140 N. E. 485. In this case the contract was for monthly deliveries of coke from March 1 to December 31, inclusive. A price was
fixed, but the contract provided that: "Should the United States government cease to regulate prices during the life of this contract, then the
price of coke covered by this contract, but not then delivered, shall be
subject to a revision to a figure to be mutually agreed upon by purchaser
and seller." On March 31 the government ceased to regulate coke prices.
Deliveries continued through May. The seller brought an action for the
coke delivered, and the buyer counterclaimed for failure to deliver beyond
May. Concerning this counterclaim, the court said: "In view of the
situation, what became the legal obligations of the parties? By the rider
it was their duty to mutually agree upon a new price after March 31, 1920,
and if such price could not be agreed upon, and shipments continued, the
seller and buyer were under obligations, respectively, the seller to ship the
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From the point of view of the business man, it appears desirable that there should be one rule of law for all open price agreements. The Sales Act seems to lend itself to that interpretation.

3.

ALTE'RNATE PRIcEs.

The contract may state the price in the alternative. Assuming that the two prices stated are not in reality the sameG7 and
that no method is provided for determining which is to be paid,
it has been argued that such a contract should fail for uncertainty.68 There seems to be no justification for such a result.
It appears to be well settled that, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, a promise to do one of several alternatives will
leave the choice of which is to be done to the party who is to
perform.6 9 Applying this rule, it follows that the contract should
be enforced at the price most favorable to the party who promises
to pay, which is to say the buyer.70 He has agreed to pay at least
that amount, and the seller has agreed to deliver the goods in
return for such a promise.
More often, however, the contract provides that the price shall
depend on some contingency not within the control of either
party. Where this occurs, the court must first of. all decide
coke, and the buyer to pay a reasonable price therefor." (Italics ours).
What is the meaning of this? If the contract fails, how can the seller
be under any obligation to ship the coke, or the buyer to pay? But why
such an obligation only "if shipments continued?"
The court then quoted the Sales Act, and continued: "On the showing
that the parties were unable to agree upon a new price during the deliveries
in April and May it became the duty of the court to ascertain what the
reasonable market was, and render judgment accordingly." Judgment for
the seller for the reasonable price of the coke delivered in April and May?
Or judgment also for the buyer for breach of the executory contract?
The actual holding of the case is that it was error to enter judgment
on the basis of the original contract price, which ceased to be in effect on
March 31st. Beyond this, it is a problem what the case means.
6TAs, for example, a statement of one price f.o.b. point X, and another
f.o.b. point Y, the difference being one of freight rates. Cf. McCaull
Dinsmore Co. v. Heyler, (1925) 48 S. D. 211, 203 N. V. 505.
6sSee McGowin Lumber & Export Co. v. R. J. & B. F. Camp Lumber
Co., (1915) 192 Ala. 35, 68 So. 263 (prices quoted "f.o.b.f.a.s. vessel
Clarabelle"); Clark Warehouse & Imp. .Co. v. Jacques & Edmond Veil,
(1922) 152 La. 707, 94 So. 326 ("to pay the sum of $10,750 in cash or
its equivalent, or notes on the delivery of the above merchandise").
693 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1407, p. 2497.
ToWright v. McCormack, (1923) 99 Conn. 145, 121 At. 467 (sale of
tractor for "$1600 to $1700") ; cf. Kramer v. Ewing, (1900) 10 Okla. 357,
61 Pac. 1064 (promise to pay $50 or $60 for finding purchaser for land) ;
Burstein v. Phillips, (1913) 154 Wis. 591, 143 N. W. 679 (sale of a
specified quantity of rags, to be made up of two qualities; held that the
seller had the right to determine the quantity of each, provided a substantial quantity of each was furnished, and the total quantity made up.)
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whether the contract is intended as a wager upon the contingency
named. Such a contract, of course, would be contrary to public
policy and void. The courts have adopted the practical test,
whether the contingency upon which the price is made to depend
so affects the value of the goods sold as to justify the price
alternative. If so, the contract is valid. 71 If not, the contract is
72

a wager and cannot be enforced.
4.

PRICE DEPENDING ON THE MARKET.

Instead of naming definite alternatives, the contract may provide that the price shall depend upon the state of the market at a
particular time and place. This contingency is beyond the control of either party; its relation to the value of the goods is evident, and, so long as an actual delivery is contemplated, rather
than a settlement based on fluctuations in the market price,"
there is clearly no wager. The purpose of such an arrangement
7'Ferguson v. Coleman, (1846) 3 Rich. Law (S.C.) 99 (promise to pay
$902 for land if cotton should rise to 8c by Nov. 1st, if not, to pay $500) ;
Ames v. Quimby, (1877) 96 U. S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 635 (price to be increased
or decreased with rise or fall in value of gold, with a proviso that a
rise or fall of 25% should not change the contract price unless it continued
sufficiently long to affect the general price of merchandise); Montague v.
Lumpkin & Perry, (1919) 178 N. C. 270, 100 S. E. 417 ($1000 for a crop
of tobacco if there should be 3000 pounds, otherwise $900) ; Moore v. Zita
Bennitt & Co., (1921) 147 Ark. 216, 227 S. W. 753 (price dependent on
whether cotton delivered in two lots or one); Manley v. Pacific Mill &
Timber Co., (1926) 79 Cal. App. 641, 250 Phc. 710; Newell v. Smith,
(1885) 53 Conn. 72, 3 Ati. 674; Deyo v. Hammond, (1894) 102 Mich. 122,
60 N. W. 455; cf. Phillips v. Gifford, (1898) 104 Iowa 458, 73 N. W. 1033.
The contingency must, however, be an objective one, ascertainable
with reasonable certainty. Thus in Guthing v. Lynn, (1831) 2 B. & Ad.
232, the buiyer of a horse promised that "if the horse was lucky to him,
he would give £5 more, or the buying of another horse." This was held
too uncertain.
72Givens v. Rogers, (1847) 11 Ala. 543; Craig v. Andrews, (1858) 7
Iowa 17; Hizer v. State, (1859) 12 Ind. 330; Lucas v. Harper, (1873)
24 Ohio St. 328; Merchants' Say. Co. v. Goodrich, (1874) 75 Ill. 554;
Bates v. Clifford, (1875) 22 Minn. 52; Davis v. Leonard, (1879) 69 Ind.
213; Harper v. Crain, (1881) 36 Ohio St. 338; First Nat'l Bank of
Creston v. Carroll, (1890) 80 Iowa 11, 45 N. W. 304; Lynch v. Rosenthal,
(1896) 144 Ind. 86, 42 N. E. 1103; cf. Comer v. Powell, (Tex. Civ. App.
1916) 189 S.W. 88.
Even though the contingency has some bearing upon the value of the
property, if the difference in price is out of all reasonable proportion, the
contract is a wager. Brogden v. Marriott, (1836) 3 Bing. N. C. 88
(sale of a horse for £200 if he trotted 18 miles in an hour, but for 1
shilling if he failed to do so); Rourke v. Short (1856) 5 El. & BI. 904
(wager on price of previous sales, forgotten by the parties). But see
Deyo v. Hammond, (1894) 102 Mich. 122, 60 N. W. 455; Carlill v.

Carbolic
Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 484, [1893] 1 Q. B. 256.
73

Gaming contracts where no delivery is contemplated are discussed in
2 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 664, pp. 1673-1680.
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is to provide a future point at which the risks of the market
shall be shifted. Until that time the seller takes all the risk of a
decline in price, the buyer all the risk of an advance.
The courts have shown no reluctance to enforce such contracts. The agreement often provides that the buyer is to pay the
market price at a date 4 or a place 5 to be selected, within certain
reasonable limits, by one of the parties. In such a case the party
named is given an option, with a range of selection and an opportunity to follow the market which may be of considerable
practical advantage. A common transaction of this type is the
"call" contract, frequently used in the sale of cotton, grain and
similar products, on their way from the grower to a central
exchange. The goods are delivered to the buyer upon his agreement to pay the market price current on any day the seller may
select before a specified time limit. Occasionally, but infrequently,
the choice is to be made by the buyer, or either party may be
given the right to name the day.7 6 Usually the contract is to
pay the price on a particular exchange' on the date selected.
The price is finally fixed by "calling" the contradt, by notice 8 to
the other party.
A transaction of this kind is a sale,79 with the price left
74
See footnote 84.
75
McNeely v. Carter, (1840) 23 N. C. 141.
7
6Burgson & Co. v. Williams, Smithwick & Co., (1929) 155 Miss. 351,

121 So.
817.
77

McConnell v. Hughes, (1872) 29 Wis. 537; Jones v. Kemp, (1882) 49

Mich. 9, 12 N. W. 890; Barnes v. McCrea, (1888) 75 Iowa 267, 39 N. W.
392; South Carolina Cotton Growers Coop. Ass'n v. Weil, (1929) 220

Ala. 568, 126 So. 637; Burgson & Co. v. Williams, Smithwick & Co., (1929)
155 Miss. 351, 121 So. 817.
In Maxwell Planting Co. v. A. P. Loveman & Co., (1924) 212 Ala.

228, 102 So. 45, the contract was that the seller should call for payment
on any date between October 1 and May 1, on the basis of the market
value of 1trict middling cotton in New Orleans on that day, less express
from Tuscaloosa to New Orleans. Evidence of a custom that such prices
were to be fixed by official spot quotations of the New Orleans cotton

exchange
was held admissible.
78
As to what constitutes sufficient notice, see Smith v. Duncan, (Tex.

Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 233, aff'd (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919) 209 S. W.
140. 9

7 McConnell v. Hughes, (1872) 29 Wis. 537 (if the property is
destroyed, the seller may still call the contract, and is entitled to payment) ;
Richardson v. Olmstead, (1874) 74 Ill. 213; Jones v. Kemp, (1882) 49
Mich. 9, 12 N. W. 890; Handwerk v. Oswood, (1886) 23 I1. App. 282;
Barnes v. McCrea, (1888) 75 Iowa 267, 39 N. W. 392.
In Bui-ke v. Boulder Milling & Elevator Co., (1925) 77 Colo. 230, 235
Pac. 574, the agreement was that the buyer might use the seller's wheat,
and either pay at a date and price fixed by the seller, or return grain of

the same kind and quantity. This was held, on the peculiar facts of the case,
to be a bailment.
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open, to be determined in a manner definitely agreed. 80 Against
the objection that it is a gaming contract, since it enables the
seller to speculate upon the future of the market, the courts have
held that there is no illegality,8 ' because the goods are actually
delivered, and the future market price clearly has a bearing upon
their value. In a line of Texas cases,82 in which advances were
made on the purchase price at the time of delivery, it has been
held that there was a wagering element involved, on the theory
that the contract consisted of two parts, a completed sale for a
fixed price, and a gamble in market futures; but the soundness
of these decisions seems open to some question. 83 There appears
to be no obvious public policy to prevent a seller from disposing
of his goods, and reserving the' right to determine later the
8OCf. Section 9 of the Uniform Sales Act: ". . . or may be left to be
fixed in such manner as may be agreed. . .

."

See footnote 32.

slKirkpatrick v. Bonsall, (1872) 72 Pa. St. 155; Smith v. Duncan,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 233, aff'd (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919)
209 S. W. 140; South Carolina Cotton Growers Coop. Ass'n v. Weil,
(1929) 220 Ala. 568, 126 So. 637; Burgson & Co. v. Williams, Smithwick
& Co., (1929) 155 Miss. 351, 121 So. 817. Cf. also H. Seay & Co. v.
Moore, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 228 S. W. 610, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924)
261 S.
W. 1013, 265 S. W. 376.
82
1n Burney v. Blanks, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 136 S. W. 806, the
contract recited that the buyer bought at a price of "10.80c lb. straight," but
there was to be an "additional settlement at the market any day until
April 30." The market wefit down, and the buyer sued to recover part of
the payment made. The court denied recovery, holding that the? executory
part of the contract was a wager.
In Wolfe v. Andrews, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 192 S. W. 266, the
buyer bought at "14.39c, your option of fixing the price . . . by giving

notice." The court considered this the same kind of contract as in the
Burney case.:
Both decisions relied on Heidenheimer v. Cleveland, (Tex. 1891) 17
S. W. 524 where the contract was for future deliveries of bacon at a
fixed price, with a provision that either party should cover the other with
margins on price fluctuations pending delivery. The court left it to the
jury whether this was a gaming contract, the instructions turning on whether
actual delivery was contemplated.
SaIn Carter v. McNeely, (1841) 23 N. C. 448, the court saw nothing
wrong with a contract for the sale of cotton for the market value at the
time of delivery, with the power given the seller to vary the price by
designating that of another date and place, within a certain period.
See also H. Seay & Co. v. Moore, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 228 S. W.
610, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924) 261 S. W. 1013, 265 S. W. 376, where
cotton was delivered to the buyer "on consignment," the buyer advancing
the then market price, with the right given the seller to "sell outright" at
any date within a certain period, the price to be finally adjusted according
to the market at that date. The court upheld the transaction, distinguishing
the Burney and Wolfe cases because there title had passed immediately.
See also Smith v. Duncan, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 233, (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1919) 209 S. W. 140, where the amount advanced by the
buyer was less than the market value at the time of delivery, and the court
enforced the contract. Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of
Sales 34-36, considers these distinctions merely a form of words.
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precise date at which he will surrender the possibility of profit
from a rising market.
If the seller calls the contract, it will be enforced on the basis
of the market price of the selected date.8 ' If he fails to exercise
his privilege within the time limit set, there is more difficulty.
It has been suggested that the contract fails, and that the seller
is entitled only to the reasonable value at the time of delivery.85
Another possible interpretation is that the contract is automatically
called, and the price fixed, as of the last day of the period set'
It necessarily is implied in the contract that the seller has no right
to select any past date, after the market has declined, since this
would permit him to transfer, not a risk, but a certainty of loss
87
to the buyer
The contract may provide that the buyer is to pay the "market
price,"5 8 without specifying any time or place. In the absence of
any circumstances indicating a contrary intention, 0 the court
"4McConnell v. Hughes, (1872)

29 Wis. 537; Jones Cotton Co. v.

Snead, (1910) 169 Ala. 566, 53 So. 988; Smith v. Duncan, (Tex. Civ. App.

1914) 167 S. W. 233, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919) 209 S. W. 140; Maxwell
Planting Co. v. A. P. Loveman & Co., (1924) 212 Ala. 228, 102 So. 45;
South Carolina Cotton Growers Coop. Ass'n v. Weil, (1929) 220 Ala.
568, 126 So. 637, Burgson & Co. v. Williams, Smithwick & Co., (1929)
155 Miss. 351, 121 So. 817. See also Barnes v. McCrea, (1888) 75 Iowa
267, 39 N. W. 392; Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, (1872) 72 Pa. St. 155; Carter
v. McNeely, (1841) 23 N. C. 448; H. Seay & Co. v. Moore, (Tex. Cv.
App. 1921) 228 S. W. 610, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924) 261 S. W. 1013,
265 S. W. 376; Rose & Dasher v. Taylor, Lowenstein & Co., (1921) 26
Ga. App. 700, 106 S. E. 922; Jensen v. Turner Bros., (Mo. App. 1929) 16
S. W.
(2d) 742.
85
Spencer v. Treanor, (1922) 79 Ind. App. 578, 137 N. E. 566; Carter
v. McNeely, (1841) 23 N. C. 448. In the latter case the court said that
the special contract must be regarded to the extent that the seller could
not recover a higher price than the contract would have allowed him.
86Lang v. Leonard. Cros-et & Riley, (1928) 242 Mich. 473, 219 N. W.
610. 7
s Speucer v. Treanor, (1922) 79 Ind. App. 578, 137 N. E. 566;
McNeely v. Carter, (1840) 23 N. C. 141.
ssOr similar terms, such as "prevailing prices," New York Overseas
Co. v. China, Japan & S. A. Trading Co., (1923) 206 App. Div. 242, 200
N. Y. S. 449, or "as much as the goods are reasonably worth." HiU v.
Hill, (1794) 1 N. J. L. 261. In Hoff v. Lodi Canning Co., (1921) 51
Cal. App. 299, 196 Pac. 779, the court said: "The terms 'market price,'
'current price,' and 'going price' mean substantially the same thing."
In Duff v. Thrall, (1908) 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 136, the contract provided that the price should be Y2 cent per lb. less than the price of the
new crop then nearly ready for market. The agreement was enforced.
The price may be made to depend on the market price of other goods.
See Landeche Bros. Co. v. New Orleans Coffee Co., (1931) 173 La. 701,
138 So. 513 (price of pan syrup to depend on market price of sugar).
89
ln Shipman v. Straitsville Central Mining Co., (1895) 158 U. S. 356,
15 Sup. Ct 886, 39 L. Ed. 1015, and Corbett v. Winston Elkhorn Coal Co.

(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 577, the contract was to sell goods to an
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will interpret this to mean the market price at the time and place
In other words, we consider that the parties have
of delivery.
adopted for themselves the same standard that the court would
have applied if they had said nothing about the price at all.91
The only uncertainty in such cases lids in the meaning of the
term "market price. '92 It is the same difficulty which we encounter in determining the "reasonable value" of goods sold, or
the measure of damages for breach of the contract.93 The definition of market price, or market value, is a familiar one: it is
"that reasonable sum which the property would bring on a fair
sale by a man willing but not obliged to sell, to a man willing but
not obliged to buy." ' 4 The assumption is that there is a free
market, on which similar goods can readily be bought and sold.
If such sales are actually being made, they establish the price, and
other evidence, such as the cost of the article, or opinions as to its
value, will not be material. 99 It is not necessary that there be
daily traffic, or that the goods be bought and sold on the streets, or
even that there be frequent dealings of merchants. It is enough
if they are occasionally the subject of sale or exchange, so as to
fix at different times a customary price.9 9
But very often there is no such free market. There may be
no market at all, because there are no goods to be sold, or there
is no demand, or because sellers and buyers cannot agree upon a
price.97 Or the market may be so monopolized that it becomes
agent at the market price, the agent to resell to customers,

It was held

that the price intended must be the market price on the -date of resale, since
any other interpretation would defeat the purpose of the contract. In
Hughes Mfg. & Lbr. Co. v. Parker & Ball Lbr. Co., (1909) 53 Wash.
516, 102 Pac. 433, parol evidence was held admissible to prove a custom
as to the place. See also Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Wemyss Furniture Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 428 ("prices prevailing at time
of shipment").
90
See footnotes 95 to 109 ificlusive.
91
92 See footnote 34 and text.
See the annotation in 55 A. L R. 268 as to the meaning of this term.
932 Sedgwick, Damages, 9th ed., sec. 734, p. 1530, sec. 753, p. 1570; 2
Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 582, p. 1434, sec. 599, p. 1478.
94
Winslow, C. J., in Allen v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1911) 145 Wis.
263, 129 N. W. 1094. Cf. Holmes, C. J., in Bradley v. Hooker, (1900)
175 Mass. 142, 55 N. E. 848: "The market value is at least the highest
price that a normal purchaser not under peculiar compulsion will pay at
the time and place in question in order to get the thing." See also In re
of Farson, (1914) 187 Ill. App. 318.
Estate
95
Webber v. Preller, (1845) 5 L. T. (O.S.) 346; Althouse v. Alvord,
(1871) 28 Wis. 577; Deck v. Feld, (1890) 38 Mo. App. 674; Wagoner
Co. v. Jones, (1908) 134 Mo. App. 101, 114 S. W. 1049.
Undertaking
9
6Deck v. Feld, (1890) 38 Mo. App. 674.
97McCormick & Co. v. Hamilton, Wood & Co., (1873) 23 Grat. (Va.)
561; South Gardiner Lumber Co. v. Bradstreet, (1902) 97 Me. 176, 53 Atl.

OPEN PRICE IN SALES CONTRACTS

clear that the prices quoted are not the result of free bargaining.
In such cases the court does not permit the contract to fail, but
supplies a "market value" on the basis of such evidence as may be
available-including, for example, the cost of the goods,0 9 offers
made by or to individual dealers,' and prices at the nearest time
or place where there is a free market.10' So far from being disturbed by any uncertainty here, one court' 02 has said:
"The words 'market price' have no hard and fast meaning.
There is no magic in the term. When it becomes a subject of
legal controversy, it will be given that meaning which will best
serve the purpose and intent of those who use it in their contracts."
Even where there is an untrammeled market, there may be
more than one price. A few sellers may offer low figures which
others are unwilling to meet. 10 3 A few buyers may pay more
1102; New York Overseas Co. v. China, Japan & S. A. Trading Co., (1923)
206 App. Div. 242, 200 N. Y. S. 449; Murray v. Stanton, (1868) 99 Mass.
345; see also Nash v. Classon, (1896) 163 Ill. 409, 45 N. E. 276. In
Union Naval Stores Co. v. Patterson, (1912) 179 Ala. 525, 60 So. 807,
and Maxwell Planting Co. v. A. P. Loveman & Co., (1924) 212 Ala. 228,
102 So. 45, the official exchange quotations indicated that the market was
"'nominal" with no trading; but because of the court's interpretation of
the contract,
it was held (hat it would be enforced at the prices quoted.
9
SKountz v. Kirkpatrick, (1872) 72 Pa. St. 376; Lovejoy v. Michels,
(1891) 88 Mich. 15, 49 N. W. 901, 13 L, R. A. 770; McGarry v. Superior
Portland Cement Co., (1917) 95 Wash. 412, 163 Pac. 928. But see Smith
v. Griffith, (1842) 3 Hill (N.Y.) 333, 38 Am. Dec. 639, where the court
awarded damages on the basis of the factitious market value, upon the
theory that "this makes him whole, because the fund recovered enables him
to go into the market and supply himself with the goods of which he
has been
deprived."
99
Lovejoy v. ]Michels, (1891) 88 Mich. 15, 49 N. W. 901, 13 L. R. A.
770. In New York Overseas Co. v. China, Japan & S. A. Trading CO.,
(1923) 206 App. Div. 242, 200 N. Y. S. 449, there was a contract for the
sale of paper at "prevailing prices." There was no market price in 1,000
ream lots. 'he paper could be obtained from only one manufacturer. The
court said: "'Prevailing price' must then mean, since there was but one
source from which to procure the paper, such price as was set by that
source in the usual course of business, without undue enlargement of costs,
and with a, reasonable profit in addition." Damages for non-acceptance
were held to be the manufacturer's price to the seller, plus the seller's
reasonable profit, less the manufacturer's price.
100McGarry v. Superior Portland Cement Co., (1917) 95 Wash. 412, 163
Pac. 928; Harrison v. Glover, (1878) 72 N. Y. 451. In Hafner Mfg. Co.
v. Lieber Lumber & Shingle Co., (1909) 127 La. 348, 53 So. 646, a printed
list of a lumber association which controlled a large part of the market
was held admissible as showing current market prices. The only issue w,-as
damages.
'O'McCormick & Co. v. Hamilton, Wood & Co., (1873) 23 Grat. (Va.)
561; South Gardiner Lumber Co. v. Bradstreet, (1902) 97 Mie. 176, 53
Atl. 1102; Kountz v. Kirkpatrick, (1872) 72 Pa. St. 376; see Nash v.
Classon, (1896) 163 IlL 409, 45 N. E. 276.
lO2McGarry v. Superior Portland Cement Co., (1917) 95 Wash. 412,
163 Pac.
928.
03
7Ford v. Norton, (1927) 32 N. M61.
518, 260 Pac. 411, 55 A. L R.
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than the rest.' 0 ' Discounts may be allowed to certain customers,
or to those who buy in quantity. 05 On the same market, at the
same time, goods may be changing hands at half a dozen different
prices. The contract may dispose of the difficulty by providing
that the buyer shall pay the highest market price,108 or that some
more or less official quotation shall control.10 7 But in the absence of some such provision, there seems to be no very uniform
method of dealing with the problem. Sometimes special prices
are considered20 8 in determining the "market price," sometimes
not,' 0 9 apparently according to the court's opinion as to whether
261; cf. Paxton & Gallagher Co. v. Pellish, (1931) 43 Wyo. 182, 299
Pac. 708.
lO4Hoff v. Lodi Canning Co., (1921) 51 Cal. App. 299, 196 Pac. 779;
Spang v. Rainey, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1897) 79 Fed. 250; Taylor Oil & Gas
Co. v. Pierce-Fordyce Oil Ass'n, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 467.
For a discussion of the uniformity of market prices, see Copeland, Principles05of Merchandising (1924) 335.
Orchard v. Simpson, (1857) 2 C. B. (N.S.) 299; Abshire v. Smith,
(1927) 86 Ind. App. 354, 156 N. E. 408; McGarry v. Superior Portland
Cement Co., (1917) 95 Wash. 512, 163 Pac. 928; Charrington v. Wooder,
[1914] A. C. 71. Trade and quantity discounts are discussed in Copeland, Principles of Merchandising, (1924) pp. 353-357.
'"6Daniel v. Hannah, (1898) 106 Ga. 91, 31 S.E. 734 ("its highest
market price in Thomaston on November 10, 1896"); Stem v. Ladew,
(1900)0 47 App. Div. 331, 62 N. Y. S.267.
1 TAmerican Car & Foundry Co. v. East Jordan Furnace Co., (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 787 (price quoted in the Iron Age); Boret v. L.
Vogelstein & Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 605, 177 N. Y. S. 402 (prices
published in the Engineering & Mining Journal); Le Blanc v. Godchaux
Co., (1922) 152 La. 405, 93 So. 201 (prices quoted by secretary of sugar
exchange); Union Naval Stores Co. v. Patterson, (1912) 179 Ala. 525,
60 So. 807 (Savannah Board of Trade quotations); Maxwell Planting
Co. v. A. P. Loveman & Co., (1924) 212 Ala. 228, 102 So. 45 (custom
to take
New Orleans cotton exchange official quotations).
08
In Ford v. Norton, (1927) 32 N. M. 518, 260 Pac. 411, the contract
was to buy gasoline "at current market prices." There was a gasoline war,
and the seller refused to meet lower prices of competitors who had been
encouraged by the buyer. It was held that-the "market price" was the
lower figure fixed by the competitors while their supply lasted. See also
Hoff v. Lodi Canning Co., (1921) 51 Cal. App. 299, 196 Pac. 779;
McGarry v. Superior Portland Cement Co., (1917) 95 Wash. 412, 163 Pac.
928. In Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Pierce-Fordyce Oil Ass'n, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920) 226 S. W. 467, the contract was to pay "the regularly established and published market quotations for the highest grade crude oil,
as grades are now established in the Electra market." One buyer posted
a bona fide higher price. It was held for the jury whether this was a regularly 09established market quotation.
1 In Orchard v. Simpson, (1857) 2 C. B. (N.S.) 299, and in Abshire
v. Smith, (1927) 86 Ind. App. 354, 156 N. E. 408, it was held that the
buyer was not entitled to the benefit of quantity discounts given to certain
purchasers. In Charrington v. Wooder, [1914] A. C. 71, where there was
one market price on beer for "tied" houses, and another for "free" houses,
it was held that the buyer was not entitled to the lower "free" price.
See also Spang v. Rainey, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1897) 79 Fed. 250, where
the price was fixed, "to continue until there may be a general advance in
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such prices would have affected the contract between the particular parties, if they had been bargaining at the time.
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the contract to pay the
"market price" is regarded as reasonably certain, and is enforced.
5.

Paica

DEPENDING ON COST.

The price may be made to depend on the cost of the goods
to the seller. The effect of such a contract is to shift all the
risks and opportunities of the market immediately to the buyer.
The seller receives a small but assured profit, usually in the form
of a percentage of the cost. If there is any greater profit, it goes
to the buyer; if there is any loss, it is his.110 "Cost plus" arrangements are very common in building contracts,'" and in recent
years they have become more frequent in the sale of goods.
They provide a convenient method for arriving at a fair price
for new commodities, or other goods which have no market price;
but they have the marked disadvantage that the seller is under
no incentive to keep down the cost." 2
the market price of coke. Then and in that event the price shall be the
lowest rate at which coke is sold to the larger and better consumers of coke
in the market." In determining whether there had been a "general advance" in the market price, the court said that proper consideration must
be given to all the different ways in which coke was bought and sold, but
that the advance must be a "general" one according to trade acceptation, and
not a special advance by a limited number of dealers to a special class of
customers. The jury was at liberty to disregard continued deliveries to
old customers at the former prices.
In Cobbs & Mitchell v. Boyne City Tanning Co., (1913) 178 Mich. 88,
144 N. W. 487, the price was to be based on the average price of the tanners
in Chicago, Kenosha, Milwaukee, or other principal tanning points when
they were making their first large contracts for the current year. It was
held that only prices on Lower Peninsula goods similar to those sold by
the seller were to be considered, and not prices on Upper Peninsula goods
of an inferior grade.
110In Paper Mill Supply Co. v. Container Corp. of America, (1930)
301 Pa. St. 62, 131 Ati. 588, the court distinguished a contract under which
the seller was to supply all the waste paper it could collect, the paper and
hauling to be paid for at temporary rates; if these rates did not cover
the cost to the seller, the buyer was to make good whatever losses the
seller suffered. This was held not to be a "cost" or "cost plus" contract,
since in such a contract the seller's profit is limited to a certain amount;
here, if there is any profit, the seller keeps it, and the buyer cannot profit
at all. "It is difficult to imagine a more jughandled contract than this
would be." It was held that the contract failed, because it was too
indefinite and uncertain as to the liability imposed.
But why? Once the cost to the seller is determined, what uncertainty
remains? And, if he so agrees, why should not the buyer assume all risk
of loss, without a corresponding opportunity for profit?
lInBuilding contract cases are collected in annotations in 2 A. L. R. 126

and 27 A. L. R. 48.

li2See 2 Harvard Business Review 370.

The writer points out that
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A court with such a contract before it is invited to determine
the "cost" of the goods to the seller. If the seller is merely reselling what he has previously. bought, the problem is relatively
simple. Only such items as the purchase price, freight, and expenses of handling or installation are involved,118 and there is
seldom any difficulty. But where the seller manufactures the
goods himself, the court is plunged at once into questions of cost
accounting, and the distribution of various overheads,11 4 where
the precise intent of the parties becomes in the highest degree uncertain. The "cost" of a manufactured article is a very indefinite
on a falling market the price in a "cost plus" contract will be higher than
the market price. Also that every such contract tends to reduce the cost,
because of increased production, but that the saving will be spread over the
entire output. See also Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of
Sales 29.
'1 5 Lund v. McCutchen, (1891) 83 Iowa 755, 49 N. W. 998 (price plus
freight); Boaz v. Owens, (1898) 20 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 45 S.W. 876 (price
plus freight and expense 'of.putting up machine) ; J. W. Finn & Co. v. Culberhouse, (1912) 105 Ark. 197, 150 S. W. 698 ("wholesale cost" held to
include price, freight and drayage charges, in the light of local custom);
Swisher v. Dunn, (1913) 89 Kan. 412, 131 Pac. 571 ("invoice purchase
price" held to mean what the seller paid when he bought, rather than
what it would cost to buy from wholegalers at the time of sale).
In McCoy v. Hastings & Bradley Co., (1894) 92 Iowa 585, 61 N. W.
205, a stock of goods was sold at "64 cents on the dollar on cost price
of said property, inventory to be taken as soon as possible." It was held
that the buyer was not entitled to the benefit of cash discounts, the time
for which the seller had allowed to expire. In Eagan v. Claskey, (1887)
5 Utah 154, 13 Pac. 430, "original cost" to the seller was held not to
include the cost of his loans to the party from whom he bought. In
Braverman v. Naso, (1927) 203 Iowa 1297, 214 N. W. 574, evidence
of the condition of the goods three years after the sale was held to have
no bearing on the cost.
In Knopfler v. Flynn, (1917) 135 Minn. 333, 160 N. W. 860, an action
for deceit, representations as to the "invoice price" were held to have.
reference to the cost price, rather than the actual inventory value. In
Sell v. Lenz, (1921) 149 Minn. 200, 183 N. W. 135, "invoice price" was
interpreted in the light of the conduct of the parties to mean the retail or
inventory price, rather than the wholesale price, as a basis for computing
the contract price.
See also Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Gopher Lath & Fuel Co., (1927)
170 Minn. 288, 212 N. W. 459 ("market replacement value").
In Dwight Brothers Paper Co. v. Ginzburg,*(1925) 238 Ill.
App. 21, the
contract provided: "The maximum price at which this naper is to bo
billed to you is 5yAc per lb. net cash 30 days from date of invoice, sidewalk delivery. We are to give you the benefit of any reduction in price
which the mill makes during the life of this contract." The court refused
to permit recovery on this contract for paper delivered, saying that the
price could not be ascertained with certainty. The particular "mill" intended, and the extent of the deduction from the maximum price were not
stated. The case was remanded for evidence on the basis of quantum
meruit.
114
See John Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead
Costs, (1923).
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term," 5 depending almost entirely upon the accounting system
adopted."'
Not all the difficult questions presented in connection with "cost plus" building contracts 1 7 have arisen as yet
in cases of the sale of goods, but there seems to be no reason why
they should not be involved-including, for example, the apportionment of salaries and wages, financing costs, interest and carrying charges, depreciation of equipment, taxes and general office
expenses, and the question. of how far the cost has been kept
down to a reasonable figure. Unless the contract expressly limits
the cost to particular items, such as "labor, materials and supplies,"" 8 the court must necessarily decide how far these factors
are to be considered." 9
In at least three cases the court has been compelled to face
these issues. In Massachusetts it was held 120 that "actual cost"
was made up of items "substantially if not exactly the same as
the items to be deducted from gross receipts to ascertain net
profits," and therefore included shrinkage of materials, insurance,
depreciation of plant, rent, and services of personnel. The Penn"15"We are All familiar with the seemingly insuperable difficulty of
ascertaining the cost, for example, of producing a pound of cotton or of
making a yard of cloth; and perhaps no two persons engaged on the
problem would agree on the prime elements of the calculation, as none of the
parties, witnesses, or the master could agree on them in this case. Even
in the simpler application to mere bargain and sale of a thing already in
existence, and not to be manufactured, the term is ambiguous, and so
much so that it is not impossible that often it will be found to avoid the
contract for incurable uncertainty, though I have not found it necessary to
go into that subject." Hammond, J., in Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v.
Citizens'
St. Ry. Co., (C.C. Tenn. 1896) 72 Fed. 317.
116See 2 Harvard Business Review 370.
"'7See the annotations in 2 A. L. R. 126, and 27 A. L R. 48, for discussion of the various items making up "cost."
" 5SKann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., (1925) 81 N. H. 535, 129 At. 374.
See also Thuman v. Clawson & Wilson Co., (1925) 211 App. Div. 507, 207
N. Y. S. 565 ("The above quotations . . . shall increase or decrease in
proportion to future fluctuations in the cost of labor or findings and
materials at the mills"), and also Humphrey v. Holden, (1909) 157 Mich.
481, 122 N. W. 103 ("107o above cost of manufacture, said cost to include cost of raw material, running of plant, management, labor, salaries,
taxes, insurance, etc.")
19 "'7twould be comparatively easy to measure or weigh the materials
used in these boilers, count the price or value of it, keep account of the
hours of labor, and its value or price, and find these two primary factors
of the problem, and also quite easy to avoid all the rest by counting these
and ordinary freight and charges as the only cost; but that is hardly fair
to the plaintiff, and so far from merely cutting away its 'profit,' which was
agreed to be surrendered, would probably entail a loss." Hammond, J.,
in Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., (C.C. Tenn. 1896)
72 Fed.0 317.
12 Fillmore v. Johnson, (1915) 221 Mass. 406, 109 N. E. 153. This
was a contract for the manufacture of toilet paper tissue, at "cost of
tissue, plus 5% and actual cost of finishing."
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sylvania court in one case 12' refused to deduct the value of byproducts from the cost of manufacture, but in another,1 22 where
the issue was merely the determination of damages upon the
basis of cost, conceded that by-products were to be considered but
refused to include fixed charges for labor, salaries, office expenses, taxes, insurance, legal fees, interest on indebtedness, and
depreciation. 28 Mr. Justice Washington once plaintively lamented1 2' that any court should ever be called upon to interpret
"expressions of such doubtful import, without a clue to ascertain with precision what was the real intention;" but apparently
no court has ever permitted a contract to fail because of the
indefinite meaning of "cost.'

25

"-aBaeder-Adamson Co. v. F. W. Tunnell & Co., (1926) 285 Pa. St.

356, 132 Atl. 172. A contract for the sale of glue, at "the per pound cost
of manufacture as shown by the books of the seller, this cost to be based
on all charges entering into the manufacture of glue . . . plus the cost
per pound of stock used in the manufacture of the glue, plus a fixed
profit at the rate of 2 cents per pound." The court was somewhat influenced
by practical construction of the contract.
122 Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1929) 297 Pa. St.
483, 147
22 Atl. 519.
8The following passage illustrates the court's argument: "Perhaps
no better illustration can be given of the error of the rule applied by the
court below than by calling attention to the fact that, under it, the profits
of a particular contract are made to depend on whether or not it is to be
performed by an individual (whose general indebtedness never would be considered in such cases) or by a corporation, and, if by the latter, upon
whether or not it has a general corporate indebtedness. The additional
material required to carry out the contract, plus the value of the byproducts obtainable, were properly considered, but there would have been
no increase in labor or deterioration of machines, and the general corporate
expense for the five mills would not have varied."
See also the following decisions of the War Department, Board of
Contract Adjustment: In re Claim of American Process Co., (1920) 4
War Dept. Board of Contract Adjustment 221 (allowing as cost items
bonus payments to employees and others, and depreciation on patents and
patterns, but disallowing salary of an absent executive, commissions paid to
officers, and advertising charges); In re Claim of Crown Cork & Seal
Co., (1920) 4 War Dept. Board of Contract Adjustment 136 (extra costs
due to inexperience of manufacturer disallowed) ; In re Claim of American
Steel and Wire Co., (1920) 5 War Dept. Board of Contract Adjustment
426 (same); In re Claim of Van Dor Iron Works Co., (1920) 8 War
Dept. Board of Contract Adjustment°284 (factory management and general
administrative expense).
'12InGoodwin v. United States, (C.C. Pa. 1811) 2 Wash. C. C. 493,
Fed. Cas. No. 5,554.
1251n Buckmaster v. The Consumers Ice Co., (1874) 5 Daly (N.Y.)
313, the contract was for the delivery of ice at a price to afford the seller
a "net profit not to exceed one dollar per ton." It was held that the
contract failed because the margin of profit was not definitely fixed. As
an additional reason, the court mentioned the difficulty of determining the
cost to the seller on which the net profit was to be based. See also the
dictum in Hazleton Tripod-Boiler Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., (C.C.
Tenn. 1896) 72 Fed. 317, quoted in footnote 115.
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Once the cost is settled, there remains the seller's margin of
profit. Generally this is fixed by the contract, but occasionally it
is left open. In one case, where the agreement was to pay the
"'original cost, plus cost of handling, and a 'nice' or reasonable
profit," the court held the contract unenforceable, upon the ground
that a reasonable return for the seller's skill and the risks assumed could not be ascertained by permissible methods of trial.126
The decision seems unfortunate; there-is usually no more difficulty in arriving at a "reasonable profit" than at a "reasonable
price." There is some little authority in favor of the validity of
12
such a contract.
Rather than the entire cost, the price may be made to depend
on particular items. Common examples are the "sliding scale"
contracts, in which it is agreed that the price of a manufactured
article shall go up or down in accordance with stipulated changes
in the market price of the basic raw material. The price of steel
is made to depend on that of pig iron; the price of tin cans
varies with that of tin plate.128 The wisdom of such contracts,
for an entire industry, has been doubted, 129 but they are likely to
' 26Gaines & Sea v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (1915) 163 Ky. 716,
174 S. W. 482. The court argued that a reasonable profit would involve
reasonable compensation for the shrewdness, energy and skill of a tobacco
buyer, as well as due return on the financial investment hazarded. "These

inquiries are of such nature that their determination would lead so far
afield, into the realm of surmise, that the processes by which their establish-

ment might be attempted to be effected would not meet with the sanction of
recognized principles of procedural law."
See also Buckmaster v. The Consumers Ice Co., (1874) 5 Daly (N.Y.)
313, where the contract was for a price on ice to give the seller a "net
profit not to exceed one dollar per ton." See footnote 125.
127hn Lanford v. United States Wooden-Ware Co., (1901) 127 Mich.
614, 86 N. W. 1033, prices were quoted, with the provision: 'Ifit shall

appear that the prices named herein will not leave us a fair margin, we wish
to avail ourselves to offer you another proposition as to price" It was

held that the seller could enforce the contract. "The fact that the plaintiff

reserved the right to abandon the contract under certain conditions made
it none the less binding on the defendant, if it chose to contract on those
terms."
See also New York Overseas Co. v. China, Japan & S. A. Trading
Co., (1923) 206 App. Div. ?42, 200 N. Y. S. 449, where, in default of a
market price, the contract was enforced at cost, "with a reasonable profit
in addition"--the court thus adopting voluntarily the standard which was

considered too uncertain in the Gaines Case, (1915) 163 Ky. 716, 174 S. W.
482, supra n. 126. Also Twist v. Roane, (1927) 174 Ark. 35, 294 S. W.
62, where a materialman furnishing goods at "cost' on cash terms was

held entitled to add 15% ("allowable and justifiable to add a reasonable
profit, and we do not think the added amount is unreasonable")

for

failure
2 to pay cash.
3s
Converse, Selling Policies, (1928) p. 279; Copeland, Problems in
Marketing,
(1923) p. 742.
29
' Copeland, Problems in Marketing, (1923) p. 742, quotes the Iron
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be used when production costs are uncertain and the cost of the
goods depends to a large extent on that of the raw material. Ordinarily there is no difficulty in the enforcement of such contracts,
since the market price of the raw material is a sufficiently objective standard. On the same basis, the contract price may be
made to depend on wages, on the cost of labor and materials together, or on such elements of cost as the tariff.180 Unless the
ratio between these factors and the contract price is definitely fixed,
there would seem to be much the same difficult problem of accounting as in a "cost plus" contract, but the courts appear to have
had no such difficulty.131
6.

PRICE DEPENDING ON RESALE PRICE.

Sometimes the goods are sold under an agreement that the
buyer is to resell them, and the contract price is to depend on
the price of resale. The situation then is the converse of the
Age on the undesirable effect of such contracts, in carrying the contract
out of line with the market for the manufactured article, and increasing
fluctuations. The Iron Age mentions a case where so much tonnage was
under contracts depending on the market that the market became unreliable, and settlements had to be made upon some other basis. See discussion in Llewellyf, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, 21-22.
1SD. R. Vivion Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, (1903) 176 Mo. 219, 75 S. W.
644 ("if there was a rise or fall as much as ten percent in the market
price of the materials of which the attachments were made, there was to
be a corresponding rise or fall in the price of the attachments") ; Downey
v. Shipston, (1923) 206 App. Div. 55, 200 N. Y. S. 479 ("All orders are
based on present mining and day wage scale, and any change therefrom
shall affect price herein named accordingly") ; Kann v. Wausau Abrasives
Co., (1925) 81 N. H. 535, 129 Atl. 374 ("labor, material and supplies");
Thuman v. Clawson & Wilson Co., (1925) 211 App. Div. 507, 207 N. Y. S.
565 ("labor or findings and materials"); Urquhart Lindsay & Co. v.
Eastern Bank, [1922] 1 K. B. 318 ("cost of labor or wages"); Detrick
v. Balfour, (C.C. 1881) 7 Sawy. 348, 8 Fed. 468 (tariff-"any change
in duty to be for or against the purchasers"); see Outlet Embroidery Co.
v. Derwent Mills, (1930) 254 N. Y. 179, 172 N. E. 462 (tariff); Cub Fork
Coal Co. v. Fairmount Glass Works, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1929) 33 F. (2d)
420 (wages). See also (1929) 8 Decisions of Comptroller General of
U. S.1 512,
671 (wages).
81In Cub Fork Coal Co. v. Fairmount Glass Works, (C.C.A. 7th
Cir. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 420, the contract read: "It is expressly understood
that the price or prices named herein are based on existing rates of pay for
all mine labor and the price or prices will be subject to readjustment in
the event existing rates of pay are changed." Concerning this provision
the court said: "Had the seller exercised its right to raise the price, the
readjustment would have been merely a mathematical problem. The increase would have been the sum which measured the increased cost of
labor. This was sufficiently definite so that it would not have necessitated
another 'meeting of the minds' of the contracting parties. The new price
would have been the contract price plus the new item, which was definite
or capable of being made definite."
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"cost plus" arrangement: it is now the buyer who is assured a
small profit, generally in the form of a commission, and the seller
who has the risk of loss, and any opportunity for additional gain.
Such provisions are very common in consignment contracts, but
they may accompany an outright sale.
If the buyer does resell the goods, the contract price becomes
easily ascertainable, and there is no difficulty. But while the transaction is still entirely executory, it is disputed whether the contract can be enforced by either party. A few vigorous opinions
have held that the agreement fails.13 2 Their argument is that the
buyer is under no obligations as to the price for which he may
resell, and therefore there is no mutuality. 13 Here again the assumption apparently is that the right is reserved to the buyer to
act unreasonably. He is to be free to dispose of the goods at a
price so far below the market that it will be unfair to the seller.
It is scarcely conceivable that any two business men would ever
intentionally make such a contract. It seems necessarily implied
that the buyer is to resell the goods in a reasonable manner, that
is to say, at the best price reasonably obtainable upon the market. 1'1
This is no more difficult to ascertain than any other "reasonable
price."
In a number of cases in which the contract provided that the
buyer should resell for the "best price obtainable," and pay over
the proceeds, minus his commission, to the seller, the contract has
132
Foster v. Lumbermen's Mim'ing Co., (1888) 68 Mich. 188, 36 N. V.
171; Puryear-Meyer Grocer Co. v. Cardwell Bank, (Mo. App. 1928) 4
S. W. (2d) 489; Brooks v. Federal Surety Co., (1928) 58 D. C. App. 56,
24 F. (2d) 884, annotated in 57 A. L R. 747.
.33"According" to the provisions of the contract, the coal, when delivered to plaintiffs, would become their exclusive property. The mining
company then would have no control over it, nor over the price for which
plaintiffs might sell it. The plaintiffs would be entitled to accept any
price for it satisfactory to themselves, and in effect the transaction would
be the same as if the mining company had agreed to sell and deliver the
coal to plaintiffs, leaving-it to them alone to determine the price to be
paid for it. Such an agreement lacks mutuality, and cannot be enforced.
...The contract in the instant case does not stipulate that the price of the
coal shall be governed by the market price thereof, and the court cannot
import such a provision into the contract. It is true that the plaintiffs
would not be permitted to make fraudulent sales for price-fixing purposes,
but that rule cannot take the place of an agreement of the parties in regard

to price."

Brooks v. Federal Surety Co., (1928) 58 D. C. App. 56, 24 F.

(2d) 3 884,
57 A. L. R. 745.
4

' Cf. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, (1917) 222 N. Y. 88, 118

N. F. 214, holding that by acceptance of an exclusive agency, on the basis
of one-half of "all profits and revenues," the agent impliedly promises
to use all reasonable effort to market the product.
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been enforced.13 5 Cooperative marketing contracts very often
contain such a provision. 136 Unless we are to assume that the
agreement was meant to be an unfair one, or to accomplish nothing, it would seem that such terms are to be implied in every contract of this type.
7.

AGREEMENTS TO MEET THE PRICES OF COMPETITORS.

Another very common provision is that one party is to meet
whatever prices may be offered by his competitors. The agreement may have reference to a particular competitor, 137 or to a
particular group,13 or it may cover any prices that may be offered.
It may be limited to a fixed maximum or minimum."3
The pur35

1 Eighme v. Holcomb, (1915) 84 Wash. 145, 146 Pac. 391; Rose v.
U. S. Lumber & Box Co., (1923) 107 Or. 513, 215 Pac. 171 ("in effect, the
agreement is that the [buyer] shall pay what is the market price at the
time and place of delivery, less 2% discount for cash, and 5% commission") ;
Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, (1923) 113 Tex. 273, 253
S. W. 1101, reversing (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 248 S. W. 1109; Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass'n, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 246 S. W. 1068; see
Brown v. Georgia Cotton Growers -Coop. Ass'n, (1927) 164 Ga. 712, 139
S. E. 417. See also Hunter W. Finch & -Co. v. Zenith Fdrnace Co., (1910)
245 Ill. 586, 92 N. E. 521, affirming (1909) 146 Ill.
App. 257; Brown & Sons
v. Lincolnshire Beet Sugar Co., (1929) 45 T. L. R. 199.
In Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, (1923) 113 Tex.
273, 253 S. W. 1101, the court said: "We think the price to be paid
under this contract is definite and certain. . . . Under the contract, the
tbuyer] must resell the cotton. The amount obtained from this resale is
to be determined, not by any further negotiations between the parties to the
contract, but by external standards, that is, market conditions. . . . The
deductions are named and specified in the contract, and may be easily
ascertained. This method of determining the net proceeds of goods sold
on consignment or commission is a familiar one, and no reason has been
given why it should not be used to ascertain the price of goods delivered
under a contract providing therefor. The liberty of contract is not to be
lightly
restrained by technical rules."
13 6See the notes in 25 A. L. R. 1118, 33 A. L. R. 251, 47 A. L. R.
942; Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall, (1923) 113 Tex. 273,
253 S. W. 1101, reversing (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 248 S. W. 1109; Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass'n, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 246 S. W. 1068;
Brown v. Georgia Cotton Growers Coop. Ass'n, (1927) 164 Ga. 712. 139
S. E. 417. See also Dairymen's League 'Coop. Ass'n v. Holmes, (1924) 207
App. Div. 429, 202 N. Y. S. 663; Rifle Potato Growers Coop. Ass'n v.
Smith, (1925) 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937.
In Minn. Wheat Growers Coop. Marketing Ass'n v. Huggins, (1925)
162 Minn. 471, 203 N. W. 420, reference to the Record, p. 10, discloses
that the contract contained such a provision. The contract was sustained
against7 the contention that it was lacking in mutuality of obligation.
"1 Matthews Glass Co. v. Burk, (1904) 162 Ind. 608, 70 N. E. 371
("at a discount which will be five percent lower than the lowest price
made by the American Window Glass Company").
13sSolter v. Leedom & Worrell Co., (C.C.A. 4tn Cir. 1918) 252 Fed.
133, affirming (D.C. Md. 1917) 244 Fed. 483 (prices guaranteed against
decline
of eight named standard packs of tomatoes tu date of shipment).
' 3 9 1n Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, (1931) 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac.
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pose of this method of dealing is of course to assure to one of the
parties the best available price, and to this extent the other
party assumes all risks. In one or two cases"10 it has been held
that such an agreement does not provide a practicable method of
ascertaining the price, and therefore fails for uncertainty; but it
should be at least as easy to determine the price offered by competitors as the "market price," and the weight of authority holds
such a contract effective. 1'41
A similar problem is presented by the practice of "guarantee
against price decline." The contract may fix a definite figure, but
provide that the seller will guarantee the buyer against lower
prices. The guarantee may be" 2 against a decline in the market,""
or a decline in the prices of competitors;1"' or it may be against
206, the buyer agreed to pay as high a price for sugar beets as any competing company, provided such price would not be ruinous; a new price
received for 50% of the sugar in the bag produced from the beets to be
considered ruinous; the buyer in no event to pay less than $6 per ton.
In a declaratory judgment construing this contract, it was held enforceable; also that the motive of the competitor in fixing ruinous prices was not
material.
14°In Stout v. Caruthersville Hardware Co., (1908) 131 Mo. App. 520,
110 S. W. 619, the contract was to sell at "as low prices as the goods
could be bought for anywhere else." It was held that the contract failed:
"What were the lowest prices at which they could be bought 'anywhere'
even if we circumscribe the meaning of 'anywhere' so as to include only
markets which might be deemed accessible to plaintiff or his agent . . .
is an inquiry a court will not enter on because it cannot be answered with
certainty on a reasonable investigation." But, since the goods had been
delivered, it was held that the buyer must pay their reasonable value, the
liability being in quasi-contract.
In Bromley v. Jefferies, (1700) 2 Vern. 415, the agreement was to
pay 1500 pounds less than any other purchaser would give for an estate.
The contract was held invalid, upon the argument that if the estate was
not to be sold to any other purchaser, it was impossible to determine what
such a purchaser would give.
There are also a number of cases involving real estate, where an
option was given to buy or lease the premises for "as much as anyone else
will pay." Sometimes it- is held that such an option is invalid. Geston
& Meyenberg v. Sigmund, (1867) 27 Md. 334; Hayes v. O'Brien, (1894)
149 Ill. 403, 37 N. E. 73. Authority is divided. The cases are collected
in an annotation in 30 A. L. R. 575.
14'Matthews Glass Co. v. Burk, (1904) 162 Ind. 608, 70 N. E. 371;
Van Horn v. Kemena, (1924) 281 Pa. St. 579, 127 Atl. 233; Ailing v.
John V. Lee & Sons, (1921) 148 Ark. 655, 230 S. W. 1; Holly Sugar Corp.
v. Fritzler, (1931) 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 206; Hagins v. Combs, (1897)
102 Ky. 165, 43 S. W. 222; Baker v. Guinn, (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) 23
S. W. 604; see Stern v. Ladew, (1900) 47 App. Div. 331, 62 N. Y. S.
267; Texas Co. v. Berry Garage, (Cal. App. 1932) 9 P. (2d) 241. See also
the cases
involving guarantee against price decline, cited in footnote 156.
2
3.4 See White and Hayward, Marketing Practice, (1924) p. 459.
3
14 Wing v. Wadhams Oil & Grease Co., (1898) 99 Wis. 248, 74 N. W.
819; Paxton & Gallagher Co. v. Pellish, (1931) 43 NVyo. 182, 299 Pac. 708.
"44See White and Hayward, Marketing Practice, (1924) p. 459.
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the seller's own lower prices,' 1 5 in which event an additional ques14
tion is involved, which is considered below?.
Prices may be guaranteed only until the time of delivery, or until a specified later
date." 7 The guarantee may cover all the goods sold, or merely
148
the stock remaining on the buyers' hands at the date named.
Such guarantees are largely employed in lines where business is
seasonal,'14 or the goods to be sold are widely advertised standard

brands. 5 '

In the same manner, the buyer may guarantee the

seller against higher prices.""'

It is a subject of considerable dispute' 12 whether price guarantees are economically sound. It is contended that they encourage buying in advance, especially in slack seasons, or when the
market is declining or uncertain; that they enable the buyer with
limited capital to obtain a stock of goods at a minimum of risk,
and so relieve the manufacturer of the necessity of maintaining
large floor space and extensive stock; that they tend to place
buyers of "futures" on a par with buyers of "spots," and so to
stabilize the market; and that they enable the manufacturer to
plan his production ahead and operate his plant more steadily. On
the other hand, it is contended that they are a severe hardship on
145See Copeland, Principles of Merchandising, (1924)

'4See
footnotes 176 to 178 and text.
47

p. 342.

Sde Copeland, Principles of Merchandising, (1924) pp. 342-346.
' 48 See Converse, Selling Policies, (1928) p. 302; Copeland, Principles
1

of Merchandising, (1924)

pp. 344-345. The manufacturer here incurs the

additional risk of unfair claims by the dealer, and of overstocking the
dealer on a falling market with goods that cannot be sold.
'49Such as clothing, shoes, agricultural implements, and various kinds
of canned
goods. Converse, Selling Policies, (1928) p. 300.
' 5 OEspecially groceries, canned vegetables, tinned milk, paint, and similar
articles. See Federal Trade Commission, Digest of Replies Relative to
the Practice of Giving Guarantee Against Price Decline, (May, 1920).
A similar guarantee may even be given by a retailer to the customer.
For example, the following advertisement of Frederick Loeser & Company, Inc., of Brooklyn, is quoted in White and Hayward, Marketing
Practice, (1924) p. 462:
"We guarantee the price of everything we sell to be as low as, or
lower than, the same article or pattern can be bought anywhere else. If
in a day or a month later you find the same thing lower elsewhere, make
a claim on us and it will be allowed at once. What broader guarantee can
be given? It covers every line of merchandise we sell and under any
circumstances
the patron of Loeser's is protected."
' 5 'Providence Ice Co. v. Bowen, (1921) 44 R. I. 173, 114 Ati. 186;
Salem52King's Products Co. v. Ramp, (1921) 100 Or. 329, 196 Pac. 401.
1 See Federal Trade Commission, Digest of Replies Relative to the
Practice of Giving Guarantee Against Price Decline, (May, 1920) ; Copeland, Principles of Merchandising, (1924) pp. 342-346; White and Hayward,
Marketing Practice, (1924) pp. 459-460; Converse, Marketing Methods and
Policies, (1922) pp. 574-576; Converse, Selling Policies, (1928) pp. 299304; Lincoln, Applied Business Finance, (1922) pp. 642-644; Journal of
Commerce, April 30, 1921; Printers' Ink, October 14, 1926.
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the small manufacturer with limited capital; that they encourage
jobbers and dealers to take undue risks, and promote speculative
buying and dangerous overproduction; that they tend to keep prices
up, or to prolong a depression; and that they furnish an unfair
method of competition by which the seller may be coerced. A few
years ago the Federal Trade Commission made several complaints
of unfair practices in connection with price guarantees, but discontinued prosecutions because it could not be proved that they
were an unmitigated evil. 5
It should be noted that in a guarantee against price decline
the seller assumes the double risk of either a rise or a fall in the
market. If the market goes up, he stands to lose, since he is
limited to the contact price; if it goes down, he is required to
meet it.'"5 But, since a bona fide 55 offer from a competitor is a
contingency beyond the control of either party, and the price to
be paid is always ascertainable with certainty, such contracts quite
uniformly are held enforceable. 156 The provisions of the Uni15See White and Hayward, Marketing Practice, (1924) .p. 459; Federal Trade Commission v. St. Louis Wholesale Grocers Ass'n, (1923) 7
Fed. Trade Comm., Dec. No. 1; Federal Trade Commission v. Wisconsin
Wholesale Grocers Ass'n, (1924) 7 Fed. Trade Comm., Dec. No. 489.
'"4Converse, Selling Policies, (1928) p. 299.
55It would seem that notice of such an offer should be required, with
a reasonable opportunity to determine its good faith. See Henning's Case,
(1617) Cro. Jac. 432, (promise to pay as much for goods as every other
pays; where the person is certain, the seller is not bound to give notice
of what he pays, but where altogether uncertain, such notice must be
given); also Holmes v. Twist, (1615) Hob. 51.
But in Providence Ice Co. v. Bowen, (1921) 44 R. I. 173, 114 At.
186, Where the contract was that "in the event that [the seller] receives,
in writing, a bona fide offer or offers of $1.50 per ton, or more . . . it is
agreed that [the buyer] will pay to [the seller] one-half of the increase
in price, in addition to $1 per ton, for so much of its ice as (the seller]
is able to dispose of at the increased price," it was held that the seller was
not bound to submit offers received for inspection.
In Paxton & Gallagher Co. v. Pellish, (1931) 43 Wyo. 182, 299 Pac.
708, the price was guaranteed against decline. The buyer was quoted lower
prices by a competitor of the seller, who believed that the particular type
of article would soon become obsolete. Other manufacturers did not lower
prices. The court held that the contract contemplated only a decline in the
market prices: "It did not mean the same thing as a reduced price offered
sporadically and specially by some one who wanted to get rid of a limited
quantity for a special purpose, as in the case at bar."
'"5Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., (1895) 160 Ill. 85,
43 N. E. 774; Wing v. Wadhams Oil & Grease Co., (1898) 99 Wis. 248, 74
N. W. 819; Semon, Bache & Co. v. Coppes, Zook & Mutschler Co., (1905)
35 Ind. App. 351, 74 N. E. 41; Providence Ice Co. v. Bowen, (1921) 44
R. . 173, 114 Atl. 186; Paxton & Gallagher Co. v. Pellish, (1931) 43
Wyo. 182, 299 Pac: 708; L. C. Morgan Co. v. Christenson, (1924) 65
Cal. App. 474, 224 Pac. 141; Beymer Banman Lead Co. v. Haynes, (1888)
81 Me. 27, 16 Atl. 326; see C. W. Hull Co. v. Westerfield, (1922) 107
Neb. 705, 186 N. W. 992, 29 A. L. 1. 105. Cf. also Jessup & Moore Paper
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form Sales Act' are consistent with such a result. 15 8
In many cases the seller seeks to protect himself against the
possibility of too great a loss by reserving the right to cancel the
contract if competing prices go so low that he cannot meet them.
The contract then takes the form of an agreement for a sale at a
fixed price, with a provision that if the buyer receives a better
offer, the seller shall have the option of meeting it, or of terminating the contract, and permitting the buyer to purchase from
the competitor. *"9 This is an entirely' reasonable arrangement,
and, since the right of cancellation depends upon a contingency
which neither party can control, it is generally recognized that
such a provision does not render the contract illusory. 1"
Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1925) 283 Pa. St. 434, 129 Atd. 559.
See also In re Charles Wacker Co., (D.C. Md. 1917) 244 Fed. 483,
where the court said: "In many lines it is necessary, or at all events
highly expedient to contract for goods months before they are to be
delivered. Under such circumstances the seller frequently guarantees
to protect the buyer against a decline in the price of some leading producer
or producers. Many millions of dollars of business are annually done
under contracts containing such guaranties. There is nothing immoral
in them nor are they contrary to any public policy. Business men have
use for7 them, and the courts should sustain them if legally possible."
15 Section 9 of the Sales Act is set out in footnote 32.
1561n Solter v. Leedom & Worrell Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1918) 252
Fed. 133, affirming In re Charles Wacker Co., (D.C. Md. 1917) 244 Fed.
483 (see footnote 156), the contract was to sell canned tomatoes, at a
fixed price, "Prices guaranteed against decline of the following packs of
standard tomatoes to date of shipment [naming eight brands]." The court
quoted Section 9 of the Sales Act, and said: "This statute is a formulated
statement of the recognized rule. The clear meaning of the instrument,
in the light of the admissions in the stipulation, was that [the seller] sold
the tomatoes for the price stated, but agreed to an abatement to any lower
price that the purchaser might be able to show the standard brands mentioned had reached during the life of the contract. .

.

. The contract as

to price was thus in effect fixed at the pries stated for goods of a recognized
market grade, subject to reduction in price to the lowest point reached in
the price of such goods within the period."
159 In Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1925) 283 Pa.
St. 434, 129 AtI. 559, the contract was for the sale of bleached soda pulp,
at a price to be fixed by the seller on the last day of each month for the
next succeeding month. If the buyer could submit a bona fide offer from
a responsible manufacturer at a lower price, the seller must meet it, or the
buyer was not bound during that month. If no such offer submitted, the
seller's price to be binding. The court held the contract valid, saying:
"Here plaintiff in effect says: 'I will sell pulp to you each month at the
price which I will specify; if it is higher than the best price you can
obtain elsewhere, I will either meet that price or you may fill your requirements from the lowest bidder thus obtained,' and defendant says, 'I
will buy from you on those terms.' We see nothing illegal or unenforceable
in such an agreement. It is not an unusual mercantile contract, was especially fair to defendant . . . and hence, as defendant was not left to the
mercy of plaintiff, we need not consider the numerous cases cited by
defendant, which deal with the results growing out of that character of
contract." The court cited section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act (the statute
of frauds) but made no mention of Section 9, dealing with the price.
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8.

AGREEMENTS TO MAKE THE SAME PRICE As THAT IADE TO

OTHERS
A very similar method of leaving the price open is to provide
that it shall be the same as the price made by one of the parties

to others with whom he deals. Thus it may be agreed that the
price shall be the same as that allowed by the seller to other
buyers.'-" It is sometimes difficult to distinguish such a transaction from an agreement on the part of the buyer to meet competing prices ;112 but in theory, at least, there is a distinction, because-still in theory-the prices made by the seller to other
buyers are entirely within his own control. The purpose of such
a contract is a legitimate one, since it operates merely to put the
buyer upon an equal footing with the seller's other customers
purchasing at the same time; but the subjective element involved
has given the courts considerable difficulty. One very common
illustration of such a contract is the "seller's opening price" agreement,' 6 ' by which, in a seasonal industry, goods are sold before
the opening of the season for future delivery, at a price to be
60

°1 finnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., (1895) 160 Ill.
85.
43 N. E. 77; C. W. Hull Co. v. Westerfield, (1922) 107 Neb. 705, 186

N. W. 992, 29 A. L. R. 105; Van Horn v. Kemena, (1924) 281 Pa. St.
579, 127 At. 233; Matthews Glass Co. v. Burk, (1904) 162 Ind. 608,
70 N. E. 371; Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1925)
283 Pa. St. 434, 129 Atl. 559; Semon, Bache & Co. v. Coppes, Zook.&
Mutschler Co., (1905) 35 Ind. App. 351, 74 N. E. 41; Paxton & Gallagher
Co. v. Pellish, (1931) 43 Wyo. 182, 299 Pac. 708; Rutledge v. McAfee,
(1890) 72 Md. 28, 18 Atl. 1103.
The same principle was involved in Lanford v. U. S. Wooden-Ware Co.,
(1901) 127 Mich. 614, 86 N. W. 1033 (see footnote 127); Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, (1930) 254 N. Y. 179, 172 N. E. 462 (price
"subject to change pending tariff revision"); Hunt v. Stimson, (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 447 (privilege of cancelling "if the complaint
cannot be satisfactorily adjusted"); Wood County Grocer Co. v. Frazer,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 691 (if seller finds it necessary to ask
buyer to pay more than a stated minimum, the price shall be optional with
the buyer, who need not accept shipment); Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v.
Martin, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 687 (contract terminable on
notice). See also the annotation, 29 A. L. R. 112.
l61Or that allowed by the buyer to other sellers. Libby, McNeil & Libby
v. Busse, (1926) 138 Wash. 548, 244 Pac. 963; Casein Co. of America v.
Van Dam, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909) 168 Fed. 45; see Salem King's Products
Co. v. Ramp, (1921) 100 Or. 329, 196 Pac. 401 (price guaranteed against
rise). 62
i For example, suppose an agreement that the buyer is to pay "as
much as every other pays." Henning's Case, (1617) Cro. Jac. 432. Is this an
agreement that the buyer shall meet competing offers, or that the seller
shall allow
him the same price that he makes to his other customers?
163 See Copeland, Problems in Marketing, (1923)-p. 737; Converse,
Marketing Methods and Policies, (1922) p. 574; Federal Trade Commission,
Report on Canned Foods (Dec. 1918). Such contracts apparently were
very useful under war conditions.
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announced by the seller at or shortly before the date of the
season's first shipments. Sometimes the buyer is given the
privilege of cancelling the contract if this price is unsatisfactory, 10 '
in which case there is at most an option to the buyer; but in
many cases the contract is "firm at opening prices,"'0 8 and purports to be absolutely binding.
In the case of Weston PaperMfg. Co. v. Downing Box Co.,"'0
which attracted a great deal of attention, a federal circuit court
of appeals held such a contract invalid for uncertainty. The
agreement was for the sale of a quantity of strawboard, to be
delivered in monthly installments, at a price to be fixed by the
seller in advance for each three months' deliveries, by notice to
the buyer, "which price shall be the seller's market price then
existing under this the seller's standard form of quarterly price
fixing contract." In so far as this contract remained executory,
the court found it illusory and ineffective:
"We see nothing in this contract which takes from the seller
the absolute right to fix the price in the future. Certainly defendant buyer had no voice in fixing this price.' Nor did any
third party have any immediate influence upon plaintiff in determining the price. True, plaintiff may, in acting, have been governed by a desire to hold future business, or have been prompted
by other laudable motives. But plaintiff could have arbitrarily
changed the price each quarter, and from such arbitrary fixation
defendant had no appeal. Upon the ground of uncertainty, and
also for want of consideration, we conclude the agreement as
drawn was unenforceable."
This decision " presupposes the intention of the contract to
be that the seller shall be entirely free to act unreasonably-that
is, to name as high a price as he likes. Even granting this interpretation, it may be questioned whether, as a practical matter,
there is any serious danger of unfairness to the buyer. The
164Booth v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., (1913)

21 Cal. App. 427, 131

Pac. 1062 ("subject to confirmation by the purchaser when opening price
is named by the shipper"); National Can Co. v. Robert Gair Co., (1921)
138 Md.
330, 113 Atl. 858.
165California Prune & Apricot Growers v. Wood & Selick, (D.C. N.Y.
1924) 2 F. (2d) 88.

166(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 725. See, in accord, (1925) 5
Decisions of the Comptroller General of U. S. 186.
1671n the note in (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 708, 713, in commenting on this
case, it is suggested that "the terms of the printed form gave every possible
advantage to the seller, and the buyer seems only to have signed on the
dotted line. This may have been in the court's mind when it denied the seller
recovery and commented on the fact that no third party had any immediate
influence upon the seller in determining the price." Is this the realistic
approach?
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seller is a business man. Quite apart from "laudable motives,"
it may be supposed that he will act with some business sense.
Manufacturers and wholesalers who are in a position to set prices
substantially higher than the market value of the goods to all
their customers are remarkably few. If the price is too high,
there will be no business. Even assuming that most of the
seller's customers are tied up by similar contracts, he is not free
to fix prices at will, if he has any expectation of ever selling them
again. The likelihood that the seller will fix an unreasonably
high price, in order to take advantage of the buyer, is not appreciably greater than the possibility that he will shut down his business in the cases where he has contracted to sell the output of his
plant, or that the buyer will do the same where he has agreed to
buy his requirements.16
But does the contract mean that the seller is to be entirely
free to name a price? Are we to suppose that the buyer intends
a promise to pay whatever outrageous price the seller may ask?
Or that the seller expects anything more than the buyer's obligation to accept the goods, provided the figure set is reasonable?
The presumption is that reasonable conduct and fair dealing are
intended; is it not implied in such a contract that the seller's
price shall be a "market price," at which the goods are capable
of being sold to customers on the open market?160 The follow'"Note, (1927) 27 Col. L Rev. 708, 713; note, (1926) 26 Col. L
Rev. 726; 1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 104, p. 217; 2 Williston, Sales, 2d

ed., sec. 464, pp. 1170, 1171.
& Nixon Co., (1931)

v. Austrian, (1873)
soTA LAw REvmw
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See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Paine

182 Minn. 159, 224 N.

V. 453, 455, overruling Bailey

19 Minn. 535 (Gil. 465), and comment in 15 MmnN469.

16 An ingenious argument to this effect is found in Kings County

Packing Co. v. Sunland Sales Coop. Ass'n, (1929) 100 Cal. App. 126, 279
Pac. 1036. The contract was that the "buyer shall pay hereunder for twocrown loose Muscats per pound the price quoted by seller on 15-ounce

seeded cartons less four cents."

It was held that the seller was bound to

fill orders at its general market price, rather than at a higher price quoted

to four of its seventeen divisional sales offices. The court said:
"All of the dictionaries . . . concur that the definition of the term

'quoted' is to name or give the current market price. 'Market price means
the current price.' Sloan v. Baird, 162 N. Y. 327, 56 N. E. 752. 'Market
price' and 'market value' when applied to any article mean the same thing.
They mean the price or value of the article established or shown by sales
in the way of ordinary business . . . 'Market value' is the price at which

goods are freely offered in the market to all the world ... It is clear, then,
that the term 'price quoted' in the contract was intended to mean the
price quoted in the general market, and not in a few particular localities."
See also Salem King's Products Co. v. Ramp, (1921) 100 Or. 329, 196
Pac. 401, where the contract was to purchase loganberries. "If [the
buyers] raise their buying price to other growers in 1918 or thereafter,
this contract will automatically conform to that price." It was held that
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ing is the answer of a lower federal court"

°

to the reasoning of

the Weston Case:

"In construing contracts in which persons seek to cover the
contingencies and uncertainties of crops that are yet to mature,
provisions reasonably adapted to that end should not be made
futile and meaningless, because they contain some element of the
'will, wish or want' of one of the parties. Into each such stipulation the law will inject the requirement of good faith and fair
dealing. Better it is that there should be some indefiniteness and
uncertainty in contracts such as these than that the growers of
commodities, and the merchants who deal in them, should be told
that, unless they are able accurately to foretell what nature holds
in store they cannot safely make contracts which will in some
degree be dependent upon future events."
In a number of cases in which the seller did in fact set a
reasonable price, it has been held that the contract could be enforced. 171 The price to which the buyer is entitled is the price
the buyers were required to have a good faith price to other growers, and
that it was the intention of the parties that the buyers should pay the
market priced The contract was construed against the buyers, who drew it.
170 California Prune & Apricot Growers v. Wood & Selick, (D.C. N.Y.
(1924)
2 F. (2d) 88.
1T1California Prune & Apricot Growers v. Wood & Selick, (D.C. N.Y.
1924) 2 F. (2d) 88; Beardsley v. Smith, (1895) 61 Ill.
App. 340 (seller's
"lowest jobbing prices") ; Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Busse, (1926) 138
Wash. 548, 244 Pac. 963; Moore v. Shell Oil Co., (Or. 1931) 6 P. (2d)
216; Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Petroleum Products Storage Co.,
(Tenn. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 317; Kings County Packing Co. v. Sunland
Sales Coop. Ass'n, (1929) 100 Cal. App. 126, 279 Pac. 1036; Plymouth
Cordage Co. v. Pennsylvania Wood Co., (1902) 203 Pa. St. 206, 52 Atl. 245;
Casein Co. of America v. Van Dam, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909) 168 Fed. 45;
Standard Oil Co. v. Wright Oil Service Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1928)
26 F. (2d) 895.
In Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Wemyss Furniture Co., (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 428, the contract was for a sale of furniture to
be manufactured by the seller, at "prices prevailing at time of shipment."
The court said: "Whether the price to be paid was the market price at
the time of delivery, as claimed by defendant, or the price fixed by
plaintiff at its factory, as plaintiff asserts, the data for determining the price
was present, and easily ascertainable."
In Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., (1925) 283 Pa.
St. 434, 129 At. 559, the contract provided that on the last day of each
month, the sellers were to fix the price for each succeeding month; if
this was unsatisfactory, the buyer was to submit a bona fide offer from
a competitor at a lower price, which the seller must meet or cancel. If no
such offer was submitted, the seller's price was to be binding on both
parties. The court held that the contract was valid, saying that there was
no arbitrary right in the seller, and that good faith was required.
In Shell Oil Co. of California v. Wright, (Wash. 1932) 9 P. (2d)
106, the contract was for the sale of gasoline at the seller's tank wagon
price for commercial gasoline as determined and posted at the seller's
depot at Tacoma. The court said: "Appellants also complain because
the determination of the posted tank wagon price was left to respondent.
This was a matter of contract into which they deliberately entered. The
price of all real and personal property may be fixed by contract . . . The
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charged the seller's other customers who buy at the same time,
in like amounts, and under the same conditions."' It must be
the price at which sales are actually made, rather than any published quotations. 173

If

the unexpected occurs, and the seller

makes no sales, it has been held that the contract is defeated;""
but in one case, where the seller, instead of endeavoring to market
his corn, fed it to his hogs, it was decided that the contract could
be enforced upon the basis of its market value at the time he so
5
disposed of it.'7
Much the same situation is presented when the contract fixes
a definite price, but the seller guarantees the buyer against any
lower prices which he may subsequently make to other customers.' 76 There is the same theoretical possibility of unfairness to the buyer, since the seller is under no obligation to reduce
his prices with the market. Practically, this is of very little importance, unless the seller has tied up most of his customers on
similar contracts; and even in such a case, one court'" has held
tank wagon price at Tacoma was . . . not an arbitrary or fictitious price

as claimed by appellants. The prices were sent from the main office of
respondent to their managers, fixing the price throughout Washington,
Oregon, and other Pacific Coast territory."
17PIymouth Cordage Co. v. Pennsylvania Wood Co., (1902) 203 Pa.
St. 206, 52 At. 245 (buyer held not entitled to the same price as another
customer received under a prior contract) ; Casein Co. of America v. Van
Dam, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1909) 168 Fed. 45 (where buyer, doing a local business, sold out to a large concern doing business in several states, which
assumed his contracts, the seller was only entitled to highest price paid
under the original buyer's contracts).
"'7Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Petroleum Products Storage Co.,
(Tenn. 1931) 44 S.W. (d) 317; Standard Oil Co. v. Wright Oil Service
Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 895. See also Kings County Packing Co. v. Sunland Sales Coop. Ass'n, (1929) 100 'Cal. App. 126, 279 Pac.
1036.
But see Shell Oil Co. of California v. Wright, (Wash. 1932) 9 P.
(2d) 106, where the fact that the seller was voluntarily allowing certain
discounts to other dealers was held not to entitle the buyer to a similar
reduction.
17Canadian National Ry Co. v. George M1. Jones Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 240.
175Keime v. Thum, (1925) 238 Il App. 519. Corn was sold to the
buyer, the price to be what the seller received for the balance of his
corn on hand. The court held that there was a breach of an implied
promise to sell the balance of the corn, and that the seller was bound by the
market price at the time of feeding to the hogs, which was lower than the
price at the time of delivery to the buyer.
"76See also the discussion -of "guarantee against decline" of market
prices and prices of competitors, footnotes 142-159, and text.
177Salem King's Products Co. v. Ramp, (1921) 100 Or. 329, 196 Pac.
401. The buyer, operating a fruit and vegetable dehydrating plant, contracted for the purchase of loganberries, at 4c per lb., "if [buyers] raise
their buying price to other growers in 1918, or thereafter, this contract
will automatically conform to that price." The court admitted parol evidence
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that there is an obligation to set a price not unreasonably out of
line with the market. Guarantees against the seller's own decline
in price generally are held to be valid,178 apparently because the
price to be paid can always be determined with certainty, without
any regard to any question of fairness to the buyer.
It is interesting to consider the consistency of these various
results in open price cases. If the parties say nothing about the
price, the contract will be enforced at a reasonable price, upon
the supposition that that is what they have intended. If they
leave the price to be agreed, the contract fails, apparently upon
the theory that they do not intend to agree upon a reasonable
price. If the price is left to be fixed by one party only, in the
course of his dealings with others, the contract is enforced, upon
the tacit assumption that the price fixed will be a reasonable one,
and that there is sufficient consideration.
9.

MAXIMUM

AND MINIMUM

PRICES

Either the buyer or the seller may limit the risk he is to assume under an open price contract by setting a maximum or a
that agents of the buyer had represented to sellers that the buyer would
meet market prices, and held that it was the intention of the parties that
the buyer should pay the market price, with a minimum of 4 cents.
78
Twitchell-Champlin Co. v. Radovsky, (1910) 207 Mass. 72, 92
N. E. 103$; Gratz v. M. M. Graves Co., (1927) 222 App. Div. 697, 225
N. Y. S. 436; Iowa Canning Co. v. F. S. Ainsa Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
267 S. W. 540 ("price guaranteed against seller's own decline"-parol evidence that this was intended to mean price guaranteed against a general
market decline not admissible) ; California Prune & Apricot Growers v.
Wood & Selick, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 88 (coupled with "seller's
opening price" agreement); Salem King's Products Co. v. Ramp, (1921)
100 Or. 329, 196 Pac. 401 (buyer guarantees against rise).
In Rutledge v. McAfee, (1890) 72 Md. 28, 18 Atl. 1103, the contract providekl that, should any of the seller's pack be sold for less, the
buyer should have the advantage of such abatement. This was held not
to apply to a lower price subsequently made by the seller to the same
buyer. "It cannot be supposed that the appellees were securing a guaranty
that the vendor would never sell them at a lower price . . . it would seem
very clear that what the appellees were exacting and securing was protection against the sale to other people at a less price than to the appellees,
in order that the appellees might not be undersold."
In Great Northern Paper Co. v. New York Times Co., (1918) 184
App. Div. 26, 171 N. Y. S. 751, the contract was to sell white news print
paper; should the seller thereafter contract to supply its paper to others at
a lower price, the buyer to be entitled to the reduction. This was held to
cover a subsequent contract made by the seller to supply another buyer
with pink paper, produced at the same cost, but not to apply to an option
which the buyer did not take up.
Compare also Scott v. T. W. Stevenson Co., (1915) 130 Minn. 151,
153 N. W. 316, where the seller wrote the buyer: "Prices guaranteed to
March Ist, 1910, after that we are to give thirty days notice before we
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minimum price. This may be coupled with a definite provision
for the determination of the price-as, for example, an agreement that the buyer is to pay the market price at the time of delivery, not exceeding a stipulated maximum."' In such cases
there is no difficulty. But in a few instances, the contract has
contained no provision as to the price except the stated maximum
or minimum. The agreement may be merely to pay "not over
$100." Where this occurs, there are three possible interpretations which may be placed upon the contract.
First, the provision may be construed to mean that the buyer
is to pay a reasonable price, or in other words the market price,
limited only by the maximum or minimum set. This would appear to be the most obvious interpretation, and the fairest, since
it probably approximates the actual intent of the parties. They
intend to make a contract. If nothing were said about the price,
we should imply an intention to fix a reasonable one. There is
surely nothing about the fixing of a maximum or minimum limit
to do away with this implication, or to suggest that the price is
intended to be unreasonable, or the contract to fail. But apparently this view has been adopted in only one case. In Burlingto,
80
the Vermont court held that a memorGrocery Co. v. Lines,1
andum of a contract for the sale of sugar, reading "Price, not
over 26 cents per lb." was sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds. The court said briefly:
"It is not claimed that the price is not here stated according to
the agreement of the parties. By proper construction, it is a
stipulation for a reasonable price, to be determined by market
conditions existing at the time of delivery, but not, in any event,
to be more than the maximum named. Such an agreement is
valid and enforceable."
Second, it is possible to regard the contract as an option. The
buyer may be given the option to purchase at the maximum price
stated, or the seller to sell at the minimum. This represents at
least a part of what the parties intend, and results in a definite
contract if the option is exercised. The difficulty lies in finding
any consideration for the option. If the provision is that the
buyer shall pay "not over $100." where is the consideration for
advance price." This was held to mean that the seller was not to advance
prices79until after March 1st, but that there was no guarantee until April 1st.
' Compare Mitchell v. Canadian Realty Co., (1922) 121 Me. 512, 118
At. 373 ("$17.50, if price goes up you to have it, dollars per cord").
Also Wass v. Canadian Realty Co., (1922) 121 Me. 516, 118 Ad. 375.
so(1923) 96 Vt. 405, 120 Atl..169.
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his right to purchase at $100? Consideration may perhaps be
found in other portions of the contract,' or in the execution of
part of the transaction. Or, if both a maximum and a minimum
price are set, the seller's option to sell at the minimun in any
event may be consideration for the buyer's option to buy at the
maximum, and both may be enforceable as binding obligations.
182
This result actually was reached in two federal decisions.
Where both a maximum and a minimum are fixed, it is an interesting question whether there is any option to enforce the contract at intermediate prices. A parallel may be found in the case
of contracts for the sale of a minimum to maximum quantitysuch as 2,000 to 3,000 tons.8 3 In such cases it seems generally
agreed that one party is to have an option as to the amount to be
furnished, and the courts have expended a great deal of ingenuity
in determining which party is to have it. Various tests have been
suggested: the quantity is to be fixed by the party who made the
original offer, since by proposing the maximum-minimum clause
he indicated an intention that it should be for his benefit, and the
offer was accepted upon those terms ;14 it is to be fixed by the
"first actor," the party who by the terms of the contract is to do
the first act with reference to the indeterminate quantity, such as
furnishing shipping directions;" or the court may look at the
181Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power
(1922) 201 App. Div. 3, 193 N. Y. S. 698. The case was reversed,
not on82 this point, in (1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470. See footnote
-In Wood County Grocer Co. v. Frazer, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922)

Co.,
but
193.
284

Fed. 691, a contract for the sale of sugar set both a maximum and a
minimum price ("not less than 16.12c nor more than 22.12c per lb. f.o.b.
Omaha"). It was held that the seller could enforce the contract at the
minimum price. The court said: "The contract could have been enforced
by the [seller] in any event at the minimum price. It could have been
enforced by the [buyers] in any event at the maximum price. The testimony shows that the sugar called for in the four contracts was actually
tendered by the [seller] at the minimum price, and was refused by [the
buyers]. At that time the price of sugar had fallen below the minimum price
named in the contracts. This was doubtless the reason why (the buyers]
would not accept it. They adopted the view that the contracts were not
enforceable, which view we regard as untenable."
In Fraser v. Des Moines Wholesale Grocer Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1924) 298 Fed. 930, cert. denied, 266 U. S. 605, the contract fixed a similar
maximum and minimum price on sugar. It was held that the minimum
was intended to be flexible, varying with changes in freight rates affecting
the cost to the seller. The court apparently did not doubt the validity of
the contract.
' 8 3Discussed in (1924) 2 New York L Rev. 81.
28 4Farquhar Co. v. New River Mineral Co., (1903) 87 App. Div. 329,
84 N. Y. S. 802; Pennsylvania Sugar Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co.,
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1917) 245 Fed. 913; Crystal Paper Co. v. Robertson Co.,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1923) 289 Fed. 16.
1852 Mechem, Sales, sec. 1170; Crystal Paper Co. v. Robertson Co.,
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situation of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the
contract, and endeavor to determine for whose advantage the
provision was inserted.188s But if we attempt to apply these rules
by analogy to an agreement for a maximum and minimum price,
we find that they are reduced at once to an absurdity. If the
buyer, for example, is to be given the option of naming any price
between the maximum and minimum, he will always name the
minimum. If his option is merely to accept a price to be fixed
by the seller, or to cancel the contract, 1 7 neither party is bound
to anything until a price has been agreed. The difficulty in the
application of the option interpretation suggests that it does not
represent the true intention of the parties, and that a reasonable
price should be implied.
Third, it is possible to construe the contract to mean that it
is not intended to be binding until the parties have subsequently
agreed upon a price within the maximum or minimum set. It is
difficult to see why anybody should want to make such a contract;
unless the figure set is at least intended as an option,
the agreement does not affect the complete freedom of action
which the parties had without it. But one important New York
decision adopted such a construction. In United Press v. New
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1923) 289 Fed. 15; Highlands Chemical & Mining Co.
v. Matthews, (1879) 76 N. Y. 145; Dambmann Bros. & Co. v. Lorentz
& Rittler,(1889) 70 Md. 380, 17 At. 389; E. I. Dupont de Nemours Co.
v. United Zinc & Chemical Co., (1914) 85 N. J. L. 416, 89 At. 992; Hunt
v. Stimson, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 447; Wheeler & Co. v.

New Brunswick R. R. Co., (1884) 115 U. S. 29, 5 Sup. Ct. 1061, 1160,
29 L. Ed. 341.
isrSouthern Pub. Ass'n v. Cements Paper Co., (1918) 139 Tenn.
439, 201 S. W. 745; Taggert v. Brimfield, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1922) 281 Fed.
830; Wheeler & Co. v. New Brunswick R. R. Co., (1884)

115 U. S. 29,

5 Sup. Ct. 1061, 1160, 29 L. Ed. 341; De Grasse Paper Co. v. Northern
New York Coal Co., (1919) 190 App. Div. 227, 179 N. Y. S. 788; Crystal
Paper Co. v. Robertson Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1923) 289 Fed. 15; Hunt

v. Stimson, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 447; Lee v. National Box
Co., 87
(1930) 170 La. 1065, 129 So. 638.

2 1n Wood County Grocer Co. v. Frazer, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284
Fed. 691, the contract, after fixing a maximum and a minimum price, provided: "In case [the seller] should find it necessary to ask [the buyer] to
pay more than the minimum price herein shown, then said price shall be
optional with [the buyer] and [the buyer] need not accept shipment of

sugar."

Concerning this provision, the court said: "If [the seller] should

have asked more than the riinimum price, and [the buyers] should have
been willing to take the sugar at some price greater than the minimum,

then it might have been necessary to introduce parol testimony. That.
however, would not have affected the liability. It would have affected
only the extent of the liability."

In Fraser v. Des Moines Wholesale Grocer Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.

1924) 298 Fed. 930, cert. denied, 266 U. S. 605, the contract contained

a similar provision, but it was not in question.
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York Press Co., 88 the seller contracted to furnish the buyer with
a news service, at "a sum not exceeding $300 during each and
every week that such news service is received by [the buyer] until
the first day of January in the year 1900." What the parties
probably intended was pretty clearly indicated by the further
provision that after 1900 the buyer should have the right to
continue the news service, "at a price which shall be fair and
equitable to both of the parties thereto: provided, that such price
shall not be more than any other daily morning newspaper of New
York shall be required to pay"-in short, a reasonable price,
subject to a maximum limit. Upon breach of the agreement by
the buyer, the seller sought to recover "the reasonable value of
the news service for the unexpired term of the contract, less the
cost of performance." The court refused to permit such recovery,
apparently misconceiving the significance of the early English decisions under the statute of frauds, 189 and said:
"The effect upon the instrument of its indefiniteness or uncertainty as to the price to be paid was to make it operative only so
long as the parties chose and were able to agree upon the price
per week; in other words, whether it should have contractual
force would depend upon the subsequent agreement of the parties,
and manifestly, if anything remained to be done by them relating
to the subject-matter of the contract, it was an incomplete and
unenforceable instrument."
The court then proceeded, with complacent inconsistency, to approve a directed verdict for nominal damages for breach of an
agreement which was not "operative," and had no "contractual
force."190
188(1900) 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527. The contract was made in
July, 1892, and broken by the buyer on January 1, 1894. See also Prince

v. Thomas, (1854) 15 Ark. 378 (not less than $125 nor more than $150

to repair
a carriage).
189 The court quoted the doubts of Chief Justice Tindal in Acebal v.
Levy, (1834) 10 Bing. 376, 3 L. J. C. P. 98 (see footnotes 20, 21 and text),
and said that this opinion was unaffected by the subsequent case of Hoadly
v. M'Laine, (1834) 10 Bing. 482, 3 L. J. C. P. 162 (see footnotes 22 to
25 and text) : "The facts of that case were such as naturally to take it out
of the statute ....
It is evident from this opinion, as it is from the other
opinions, that the facts in the subsequent writings and conduct of the
defendant were regarded as evidencing his undertaking to pay for the
carriage quantum valebat."

190The trial court directed a verdict for six cents. Plaintiff appealed.

The judgment was affirmed, together with an additional allowance of costs to
the defendant because the recovery was less than $50. The court said:
"The defendant committed a technical breach of its agreement to receive
the news reports from the appellant, but, because of the indefiniteness of the
obligation, only nominal damages were recoverable. There was no price
fixed by the contract, and the defect could not be supplied by parol. There
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This unfortunate decision was followed91 ' by Cardozo, J., in
1"
Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co.
The contract was for the sale of 1000 tons of paper per month,
at a definite price for the last four months of 1919; for 1920,
"the price of the paper and length of terms for which such
price shall apply shall be agreed upon . . . fifteen days prior to
the expiratJion of each period.., the price in no event to be higher
than the contract price charged by the Canadian Export Paper
Company to the large consumers."
The seller refused to make deliveries in 1920, and the buyer
brought suit, claiming as damages the difference between the
Canadian Company's price and what it was compelled to pay in
the New York market. The appellate division 10 3 was of the
opinion that the buyer had an option to enforce the contract at
the Canadian Company's monthly price; and the court of appeals
conceded 94 that such an option might be found, if the price alone
had been left open for adjustment. But the decision was reversed,
and the contract defeated, because of the provision that the parties
lacking, therefore, any basis for establishing any measure of damages."
was 191
"We are told that the defendant was under a duty, in default of
an agreement, to accept a term that would be reasonable in view of the
nature of the transaction and the practice of the business. To hold it to
such a standard is to make the contract over. The defendant reserved
the privilege of doing its business in its own way, and did not undertake
to conform to the practice and beliefs of others. United Press v. New
York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406 . . ." Cardozo, J., in Sun Printing & Pub.
Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., (1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139
N. E. 470.
See also Lambert v. Hays, (1910) 136 App. Div. 574, 121 N. Y. S. 80.
192(1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470, reversing (1922) 201 App.
Div. 3, 193 N. Y. S. 698.
193
Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., (1922)
201 App. Div. 3, 193 N. Y. S. 698. The court distinguished the case of
United Press v. New York Press Co., (190) 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E.
527 (see footnotes 188 to 190 and text) upon the ground that in that case
there was no consideration for the option given; "there was no price
agreed to be paid for the option, and no part of the contract was enforceable against the party to whom the option was given." But in the United
Press case, the option, if any, must certainly be to the buyer, who was
exercising it by refusing to accept deliveries. And if there was no consideration, why the directed verdict for nominal damages?
194"If price and nothing more had been left open for adjustment, there
might be force in the contention that the buyer would be viewed, in the
This would mean
light of later provisions, as the holder of an option ....
that, in default of an agreement for a lower price, the plaintiff would
have the privilege of calling for delivery in accordance with a price established as a minimum. The price to be agreed upon might be less, but
could not be more, than 'the contract price for news print charged by the
Canadian Export Paper Company to the large consumers'." Cardozo, J.,
in Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co, (1923) 235
N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470.
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should agree upon the term during which the price was to apply.Y' 9
By this decision the intention of the parties, which must obviously have been to make a binding agreement 9" which would
insure delivery of 1000 tons of paper to the buyer every month, at
some reasonable price, not to exceed the Canadian figures as a
maximnum, is rendered nugatory, because of an item left open
which neither party could have regarded as anything but a minor
detail. The seller is permitted to withdraw from its obligations,
and leave the buyer to shoulder all the losses of the market which
it had sought to avoid, when by invoking the "standard of reasonableness," and implying an obligation to agree upon a reasonable
price, or indeed by any of a number of other possible constructions,197 the contract might easily be sustained. In view of the
195"The difficulty is, however, that ascertainment of this price does
not dispense with the necessity for agreement in respect of the term during which the price is to apply. Agreement upon a maximum payable this
month or today is not the same as an agreement that it shall continue
to be payable next month or tomorrow ....

Election by the buyer to pro-

ceed with performance at the price prevailing in one month would not
bind it to proceed at the price prevailing in another. Successive options
to be exercised every month would thus be read into the contract.
Nothing in the wording discloses the intention of the seller to place itself
to that extent at the mercy of the buyer." Cardozo, J., in Sun Printing &
Pub. Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., (1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139
N. E. 6470.
19 "Surely these parties must have had in mind that some binding
agreement was made for the sale and delivery of 16,000 ton rolls of
paper, and that the instrument contained all the elements necessary to
make a binding contract. It is a strain upon reason to imagine the
paper house, the Remington Paper & Power Company, Incorporated, and
the Sun Printing & Publishing Association, formally executing a contract
drawn up upon the defendant's prepared form which was useless and
amounted to nothing. We must, at least, start the examination of this
agreement by believing that these intelligent parties intended to make a
binding contract. If this be so, the court should spell out a binding contract, if it be possible." Crane, J., dissenting, in Sun Printing & Pub.
Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., (1923) 235 N. Y. 338, 139
N. E.97470.
1 Crane, J., dissenting in this case, pointed out the following possible
constructions, by which defendant could be held to the contract: (1) On
December 15th, 1919, when defendant deliberately broke its contract, the
buyer might have the option of" fixing the price of the Canadian Company
at that date for all deliveries-there being nothing before the court to
show that the price of paper fluctuated after that date. (2) The defendant
might be held to deliver 1,000 tons each month at the price of the
Canadian Company on the 15th. of the preceding month. (3) Since the
"contract price" of the Canadian Company is to control, the period adopted
by the Canadian Company in its contracts might control. (4) Failing any
other alternative, "the law should do here what it has done in so many
other cases-apply the rule of reason and compel parties to contract in the
light of fair dealing. It could hold this defendant to deliver its paper as
it agreed to do, and take for a price the Canadian Export Paper Company
contract price for a period which is reasonable under all the circumstances
and conditions as applied in the paper trade."
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liberal attitude of the New York courts toward open contract
terms in other cases, 19s the decision is a disappointment.
10.

PRICE TO BE

FixED

BY A

THIRD

PARTY.

The contract may provide that the price is to be fixed by
some third party. The usual interpretation of the courts in such
a case is that this is a contract for a sale at a valuation. Instead
of promising to pay a specified price, or a reasonable price, the
buyer promises to pay only such a price as the third party shall
name. The valuation is therefore a condition precedent to the
existence of any binding obligation to purchase the goods. If the
third party does not set a price, and the valuation fails, without
the fault of either party to the contract, it follows that there is no
agreement which can be enforced. 199 Both the civil law200 and
the common law have rejected the idea that the contract, in naming a particular valuer, intends merely to designate a reasonable
man, and that it will serve the purpose quite as well if any other
reasonable man is substituted by the court." '
The question first arose in equity, where the suit was for
specific performance of a contract to sell land, at a price to be
named by a third party. Originally 0 2 no difficulty was found in
enforcing the contract of sale, with some equally fair and effectual method of determining the value to be chosen by the court.
198See for example Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co., (1921) 232
N. Y. 112, 133 N. E. 370; Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, (1917) 222
N. Y. 88, 188 N. E. 214; Moran v. Standard Oil Co., (1914) 211 N. Y.
187, 105 N. E. 217; Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, (1886) 101 N. Y.
387, 4 N. E. 749; United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, (1920) 229
N. Y. 168, 128 N. E. 123; De Grasse Paper Co. v. Northern New York
Coal Co., (1919) 190 App. Div. 227, 179 N. Y. S. 788. But see also footnote 6.
199Burdick, Sales, 3d ed., p. 39; 1 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 174,.
p. 320, 321.
20
oSee footnote 4. Also Moyle, Contract of Sale 70; Pothier, Contract of Sale, sec. 24.
2011 Williston, Sales, 2d ed., sec. 175, p. 323.
2 2
6 Hall v. Warren, (1804) 9 Ves. 605. In this case the defendant
vendor had become insane, which prevented any valuation. Prior to this
time, in Mitchell v. Harris, (1793) 2 Ves. Jr. 129, it had been held that a
clause providing for arbitration of differences did not bar an action at law.
But in Street v. Rigby, (1802) 6 Ves. 815, Lord Eldon said that no
case was to be found of a decree for specific performance of an agreement to name arbitrators, and that he had known no discussion of it in
twenty-five years of experience. He referred to an earlier case, Price
v. Williams, (1790) 3 Bro. C. C. 163, (1791) 1 Ves. 365, in which he had
been counsel, where Lord Thurlow had been of the opinion that specific performance of such an agreement would not be granted.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

But in Mihnes v. Gery,20 3 it was held that the court was without
power either to compel a valuation, or to substitute the judgment
of any other individual for that of the person in whom the parties
had reposed confidence. Specific performance was denied. This
decision was followed in several later chancery cases. 20 4

It is

generally held that equity will not grant relief where the valuation fails, 203 even though it is intentionally made to fail by one of
the parties, 2 6 except in cases where the provision as to valuation or
203(1807) 14 Ves. 400. The court said: "The price is of the essence
of a contract of sale. In this instance the parties have agreed upon a
particular mode of ascertaining the price. The agreement, that the price
shall be fixed in one specific manner, certainly does not afford an inference, that it is wholly indifferent in what manner it is to be fixed. Tile
Court, declaring that the one shall take and the other shall give, a price,
fixed in any other manner, does not execute any agreement of theirs;
but makes an agreement for them; upon a notion, that it may be as
advantageous as that which they made for themselves . How can a man be
forced to transfer to a stranger that confidence, which upon a subject,
materially interesting to him, he has reposed in an individual of his
own selection?"
The court explained Hall v. Warren, (1804) 9 Ves. 605 (see footnote
202) as assuming, rather than deciding, that some means might be found

to carry
204 the contract into execution.

Blundell v. Bettargh, (1810) 17 Ves. 232; Agar v. Maclew, (1825)
2 Sim. & St. 418; Wilks v. Davis, (1817) 3 Mer. 507; Firth v. Midland
Co., (1852) L. R. 20 Eq. 100; Morgan v. Milliman, (1853) 3 De G. M.
& G. 124; Eads v. Williams, (1854) 4 De G. M. & G. 674. See Fry,
Specific Performance, 6th ed., secs. 356 ff.
The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 and the Arbitration Act of
1889 compelled the English courts to distinguish between an agreement to
fix a price by the valuation of a third person and an agreement to
arbitrate, since if one party refused to appoint an arbitrator, the statute
authorized the arbitrator appointed by the opposing party to act alone.
The theoretical distinction adopted was that there is an arbitration agreement if an inquiry in the nature of a judicial inquiry is to be held, and
decided upon evidence; but there is a valuation if a person is appointed
in advance to determine some matter for the purpose of preventing some
difficulty from arising. See Benjamin, Sales, 7th ed., p. 161; Collins v.
Collins, (1858) 26 Beav. 306, 28 L. J. Ch. 184; Bos v. Helsham. (1866)
L. R. 2 Ex. 72, 36 L. J. Ex. 20; In re Dawdy, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 426,
54 L J. Q. B. 574; In re Carus Wilson, (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 7, 56
L. J.205
Q. B. 530; In re Hammond, (1890) 62 L. T. 808.
The cases are collected in Hayes, Specific Performance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation, (1916) 1 Cornell L. Q. 225, and in
the annotation, 47 L. R. A. (N.S.) 366. There are a few decisions to
the contrary, including Lester Agricultural Chemical Works v. Selby,
(1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 271, 59 Ati. 247; Kaufmann v. Liggett, (1904) 209
Pa. St. 87, 58 Atl. 129; Bales v. Gilbert, (1900) 84 Mo. App. 675. See
also City of Fayetteville v. Fayetteville Water Co., (C.C.N.C. 1905) 135
Fed. 400, and Castle Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1906) 146 Fed. 8, where the price was considered a subsidiary matter.
206Wilks v. Davis, (1817) 3 Mer. 507; Vickers v. Vickers, (1867)
L. R. 4 Eq. 529; Darbey v. Whitaker, (1857) 4 Drew. 134, 5 W. R. 772;
Fry, Specific Performance, sec. 361. But in Morse v. Merest, (1821) 6
Mad. 26, and Smith v. Peters, (1875) L. R. 20 Eq. 511, 44 L. J. Ch. 613,
the court granted an injunction to prevent interference with the arbitration.
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arbitration relates to some subsidiary and incidental matter of
207
detail, not essential to the contract.
When the question arose in actions at law, the chancery rule
was followed ;20s but it was modified to the extent of holding that
where one of the parties is responsible for the failure of the
valuation, he may be liable in damages.200 This is upon the theory
that there is an implied promise to co-operate, by selecting a
valuer and submitting the property for valuation, and that if
either party fails to do so, he has broken his contract.2 10 A. further
relaxation of the rule is found in some American courts, in the
case of building contracts providing that payment shall be made
only after a certificate has been obtained from an architect or
engineer. Recovery is permitted on the contract without the certificate, where the architect or engineer fails to examine the work,
or unreasonably refuses to exercises an honest judgment.2Y' In
207

Hayes, Specific Performance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation, (1916) 1 Cornell L Q. 225; note, 47 L. R. A. (N.S.) 369; Binham
v. Bradford, (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. 518; Richardson v. Smith, (1870) 5 Ch.
648; Jackson v. Jackson, (1853) 1 Sm. & Gif. 154; Paris Chocolate Co.
v. Crystal Palace Co., (1854) 3 Sm. & Gif. 119; Union Pacific Co. v.
Chicago Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1892) 51 Fed. 309; Joy v. St. Louis,
(1890) 138 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 243, 34 L. Ed. 843; Burton v. Landon,
(1894) 66 Vt. 361, 29 Atl. 374; Kipp v. Laun, (1911) 146 Wis. 591, 131
N. W. 418; Black v. Rogers, (1882) 75 Mo. 441.
Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, sec. 151, finds a tendency in the later English decisions to consider stipulations for determination
of the price by third persons as matters of form rather than substance,
and to construe them as incidental to the main object of the agreement.
This conclusion is disputed by Hayes, Specific Performance of Contracts
for Arbitration or Valuation, (1916) 1 Cornell L Q. 225, 229.
20SEss v. Truscott, (1837) 2 M. & W. 385; Thurnell v. Balbirnie,
(1837) 2 M. & W. 786; Cooper v. Shuttleworth, (1856) 25 L. J. Ex.
114;20cf. Morgan v. Birnie, (1833) 9 Bing. 672.
9Thurnell v. Balbirnie, (1837) 2 M. & W. 786; Clarke v. Westrope.
(1856) 18 C. B. 765, 25 L. J. C. P. 287; Livingston v. Ralli, (1855) 5
El. & BI. 132, 24 L. J. Q. B. 269; Humaston v. Telegraph Co., (1873) 20
Wall. (U.S.) 20, 22 L Ed. 279.
2101 Williston. Sales, 2d ed., sec. 176, p. 324. Professor Williston
points out that it may be difficult to fix upon any actual damage, since
presumably if the valuers had acted properly they would have fixed a
valuation identical with the market value or real value of the property,
and explains on this basis the contrary decisions in Elberton Hardware
Co. v. Hawes, (1905) 122 Ga. 858, 50 S. E. 964, and Stern v. Farah,
(1913) 17 N. M. 516, 133 Pac. 400.
The same result is reached in the case of an architect's or engineer's
certificate on a building contract, where it is held that production of the
certificate will be excused if the failure to obtain it is due to the fault
of the adverse party. 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 794, pp. 1521, 1522.
2112 Williston, Contracts, sec. 794, p. 1522. The English rule appears
to be contra. Clarke v. Watson, (1865) 18 C. B. (N.S.) 278; In re Noth
and Cardiff Corporation, [1918] 2 K. B. 146. Cf. Hayday v. Hammermill
Paper Co., (1929) 176 Minn. 315, 223 N. W. 614.
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such cases the courts have taken the position that the judgment
of other reasonable men may be substituted.
A contract for the sale of goods at a price to be fixed by a
third party is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.2 12 1f the
person selected does in fact name a price, there is no difficulty;
the price fixed becomes the contract price, and is conclusive, in
the absence of a showing of fraud or mistake. 21 3 Even if the
third party does not act, if the property in the goods has already
been transferred to the buyer, there may be recovery of their
reasonable value in quasi-contract. 21 4 But if the valuation fails
while the contract is still executory, without the fault of either
party to the contract, it cannot be enforced.2 15 Both the Sale of
212
Norton v. Gale, (1880) 95 Ill.
533, 35 Am. Rep. 173.
213
Norton v. Gale, (1880) 95 Ill.
533, 35 Am. Rep. 173; New England
Trust Co. v. Abbott, (1894) 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 433; Wilcox v.
Young, (1887) 66 Mich. 687, 33 N. W. 765; American Car & Foundry Co.
v. East Jordan Furnace Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 787; Le
Blanc v. Godchaux Co., (1922) 152 La. 405, 93 So. 201; Union Naval
Stores Co. v. Patterson, (1912) 179 Ala. 525, 60 So. 807; Maxwell Plant-

ing Co. v. A. P. Loveman & Co., (1924) 212 Ala. 228, 102 So. 45; American
Refining Co. v. Staley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 274 S. W. 272; Luetkemeyer v. Murdock, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1920) 267 Fed. 158. A mistake as to
the meaning of the contract on the part of the valuers may be set aside by
the court.
Swisher v. Dunn, (1913) 89 Kan. 412, 131 Pac. 571.
21
4Clarke v. Westrope, (1856) 18 C. B. 765, 25 L. J. C. P. 287; Mershants Grocery Co. v. Talladega Grocery Co., (1928) 217 Ala. 334, 116
So. 356.
215Ess v. Truscott, (1837) 2 M. & W. 385; Thurnell v. Balbirnie,
(1837) 2 M. & W. 786; Cooper v. Shuttleworth, (1856) 25 L. J.Ex. 114;
Fuller v. Bean, (1857) 34 N. H. 290; Elberton Hardware Co. v. Hawes,
(1905) 122 Ga. 858, 50 S.E. 964; Stern v. Farah, (1913) 17 N. M. 516,
133 Pac. 400; Louisville Soap Co. v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922) 279
Fed. 470; Turman Oil -Co. v. Sapulpa Refining Co., (1926) 124 Okla.
150, 254 Pac. 84; Ross Lumber Co. v. Hughes Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1920) 264 Fed. 757.
In National Importing & Trading Co. v. Clark, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1920)
270 Fed. 54, the contract was for the sale of sardines, at a "price to be
fixed by the government, f.o.b. Eastport, Maine; it is understood and
agreed that whatever price the government deems proper to fix shall be
acceptable to the buyer." The time limit set for deliveries was March 1st.
The government set a maximum price, but on January 10th withdrew its
fixed price and terminated its control over food prices. On February 26th
the buyer informed the seller that the contract was void. The seller sued
for damages for non-acceptance of six carloads remaining undelivered.
It was held that a verdict should have been directed for the buyer, since tho
government had not fixed the price; "nor can the court read into the contract a fixed price, when no price has been fixed by a third party, whom
[sic] it has been agreed upon should fix the price." But the opinion
contains very peculiar language: "When on January 10, 1919, the government terminated its control over food, the [seller] was no longer obligated
to the maximum price, even if he were theretofore. . . . Thereafter the
market price prevailed. . . . The buyer had six weeks longer in which to

buy when the government terminated its control. The original contract contemplated delivery of not more than two cars a month during the season,
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Goods Act 216 and the Uniform Sales Act21 have adopted these
rules.
But, conceding that in every contract where there is a sale at a
valuation the parties repose such trust and confidence in the judgment of the valuers selected that the court is not free to substitute any other reasonable man as a referee-an assumption which
perhaps may not be altogether justified--there are still many contracts to sell goods at a price to be fixed by a third party in which
no valuation is intended. A valuation means an appraisal, an exercise of the valuer's judgment. The third party may be selected.
not because his judgment is relied upon, but because it is expected that the price which he sets will represent the market price.
The parties may intend to buy and sell at the market, and to
select a particular source of information as to what the market
may be. Thus the contract may provide that the price is to he
fixed by some official market quotation,2 18 or by the figures published in a trade journal, 219 or that it is to be set by an association
22
of dealers who control the market.

0

bilt since there was an extension to the 1st of March to take the remaining
cars, which extension omitted the amount of dtliveries per month, the
buyer still had this time in which to call for deliveries." In the light
of the
216 directed verdict for the buyer, this language is incomprehensible.
Section 9 of the Sale of Goods Act provides: "(1) Where there is
an agreement to sell goods on the terms that the price is to be fixed by
the valuation of a third party, and such third party cannot or does not
make such valuation, the agreement is avoided; provided that if the goods
or any part thereof have been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer
he must pay a reasonable price therefor. (2) Where such third party is
prevented from making the valuation by the fault of the seller or buyer,
the party not in fault may maintain an action for damages against the
party in fault."
Benjamin, Sales, 7th ed., p. 160, interprets "appropriation" as having
no technical meaning, but as meaning merely "taken as owner;" "fault"
as meaning
"wrongful act or default."
217 Section 10 of the Uniform Sales Act, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., se.
8385, provides: "(1) Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at
a price or on terms to be fixed by a third person, and such third person
without fault of the seller or the buyer, cannot or does not fix the price
or terms, the contract or the sale is thereby avoided; but if the goods or
any part thereof have been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer
he must pay a reasonable price therefor. (2) Where such third person is
prevented from fixing the price or terms by fault of the seller or the
buyer, the party not in fault may have such remedies against the party in
fault218as are allowed by Parts IV and V of this act."
Union Naval Stores Co. v. Patterson, (1912) 179 Ala. 52.5, 60 So.
807 (official quotation of Savannah Board of Trade on rosin and turpentine); Maxwell Planting Co. v. A. P. Loveman & Co., (1924) 212 Ala.
228, 102 So. 45 (official spot quotations of New Orleans cotton exchange) ;
Le Blanc v. Godchaux Co., (1923) 152 La. 405, 93 So. 201 (average price
of sugar to be established for week by secretary of sugar exchange.)
In all these cases the price was actually fixed, and the contract enforced.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

In Louisville Soap Co. v. Taylor 2 21 the contract was for the
sale of the buyer's "requirements" of rosin for one year, at a
price "50 cents per 280 lbs. over the official closing Savannah,
Georgia, market on date order is received." From January 27
until April 11 there was no trading in rosin on the Savannah
market, and the Board of Trade posted the closing price of January 22, with the comments, "nothing doing," or "nominal, no sales."
The Board of Trade was required by its by-laws to post quotations which should at all times reflect the true condition of the
market. The court held that the contract failed, since the price
was to have been fixed by a third party, who had not acted; the
board was without power to post a price in the absence of some
reasonable basis. 222 Such a decision seems entirely to misinterpret
the contract. It can scarcely be supposed that reasonable business
men regarded the Savannah Board of Trade as a valuer, or reposed any particular confidence in its judgment, except in so far
21
9Boret v. L. Vogelstein & Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 605, 177 N. Y. S.
402 (Engineering & Mining Journal) ; American Car & Foundry Co. v. East
Jordan Furnace Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 797 (price quoted
in current issue of the Iron Age).
220
Parker v. Adams, (1874) 47 Vt. 139 (schedule of association of
marble dealers controlling market).
2 21
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922) 279 Fed. 470, 27 A. L. R. 119.
2 22
"Where there is a contract to sell goods at a price, or on terms, to be
fixed by a third person, this express condition qualified the obligations of
both buyer and seller; and where such third person, without fault of the
seller or the buyer, cannot or does not fix the price or terms, the seller
is released from his obligation to sell and deliver, and the buyer is released from his promise to accept and pay. This doctrine has been
universally applied by the courts not only to contracts of sale, but to
many other forms of contract, and it has also been written into the
Uniform Sales Act adopted by many states of the Union." Donahue,
C. J., in Louisville Soap Co. v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922) 279 Fed.
470, 27 A. L. R. 119.
To the same effect is the decision in Ross Lumber Co. v. Hughes
Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1920) 264 Fed. 757, where it was provided
that the price should vary from time to time as fixed by "Shuster's semimonthly concession sheets." It was recognized in the business that Shuster's
sheets constituted an accepted report of the market price. The government
fixed a maximum price, lower than that quoted in the last Shuster's publication, and Shuster's then ceased to publish. The court held that the
contract failed: "The criterion upon which the price of the commodity to
be delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, a necessary term of a binding
contract [was to be determined?] thus, without a fault of either of the
parties, ceased to exist, and either party could refuse to be further bound
by the terms." Continuing, the court said that if a market price was
meant, a price set by the government was not enough, since the idea of a
market price was based on untrammeled dealing in the commodity, by
sellers and buyers unhampered by price fixing by governments or -,onnnolies. Cf. Boret v. L Vogelstein & Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 605, 177
N. Y. S. 402, footnote 223.
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as it might accurately report the market price.22 3 Nor is it reasonable to say that they intended that the contract should be defeated
if the Savannah Board posted no price; the obvious intent was to
close a deal at the market, and if there should be no market, then
at a reasonable price. -4 The decision seems a refinement of technicality, especially in view of the fact, disclosed by the opinion,
that there was an actual market price in Savannah, even though
2 25
there was no trading on the exchange.
It is unfortunate that the language of the Uniform Sales Act"'
which provides that
"Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price
or on terms to be fixed by a third person, and such third person
without fault of the seller or buyer, cannot or dQes not fix the
price or terms, the contract or sale is thereby avoided ..."
is sufficiently broad to justify such a result.2 2 7 But notwithstanding the number of cases bearing on the question, for some unaccountable reason this statute appears never to have been cited and
228relied upon by any court.
In some industries, where the entire market is dominated by
one large seller, small manufacturers may make contracts which
223
In Boret v. L. Vogelstein & Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 605, 177
N. Y. S. 402, the contract was for the sale of copper at the average price
(seven days before and seven days after delivery) published in the Engineering and Mining Journal. The government subsequently fixed prices,
and the Journal continued to publish them. The court sustained the
contract, holding that no valuation was intended. The Journal was not
to fix the price, but merely to report the prevailing market price, at which
the parties intended to contract. The fact that this price was fixed by the
government, and was compulsory, did not prevent it from being the accepted
market price, so long as there was actual dealing on the market at that
price.224
Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales 19, comments
on this decision as follows: "If the parties say nothing, the court will
fix a reasonable price. If they pick a particular official quotation, they
get that or nothing. Is their intent to deal not clearer, if anything, here
than there?"
225"..
. not the closing price of January 22d, which in this case
happens to be largely in excess of the actual market price in Savannah, outside the transactions in that commodity on the board of trade." Louisville
Soap22Co. v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922) 279 Fed. 470, 477.
6Section 10, set out in full in footnote 217.
227
Note that the English Sale of Goods Act, section 9, set out in
footnote 216, applies only to sales at a price to be fixed by the valuation
of a third party.
2281 Uniform Laws Annotated 52, Supplement, sec. 10. The .statute
was mentioned in Louisville Soap Co. v. Taylor, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922)
279 Fed. 470, 27 A. L. R. 119 (see footnote 222) but apparently was not in
force in that jurisdiction. The contract appears to have been governed by
the laws of Kentucky, which did not adopt the Sales Act until 1928. Ky.
Laws 1928, ch. 148.
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provide that their prices shall be the same as those of the large
concern on a given date. This enables them to enter the market
in advance of the large companies and book orders with the certainty that their prices will be in line. Thus small manufacturers
of binder twine may agree that their prices will be those of the
International Harvester Company, or the Plymouth Cordage Company. 2 2 9

If the particular seller named does in fact set a price,

the contract of course is binding at that price.2 30 If for any
reason it fails to do so, there is considerable uncertainty as to just
what the parties to the contract intend. It is probable that they
mean to sell at the market price, but with the expectation that the
dominant competitor will control the market and fix the price.
To this extent, at least, there is a reference to the individual judgment of the third party, and it may be that there is no intent to
contract for a market price to be fixed in any other way. In the
only case 231 in which the question has arisen, the contract was
held to fail, apparently upon some such theory.
11.

DIFFERENTIALS.

In the sale of some commodities, notably sugar and flour, it is
the practice to specify in the contract only a basic price for a par220

White and Hayward, Marketing Practice 459, 460.
Luetkemeyer Co. v. Murdock, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1920) 267 Fed.
158 (one cent less per lb. than carload price on binder twine to be made by
the International Harvester Co. for 1917) ; Lund v. McCutchen, (1891) 83
Iowa 755, 49 N. W. 998 (price at which the Deering Machine Co. and the
McCormick Machine Co. shall sell twine of the same quality to dealers
for the year 1889, price to be fiked on or about February 1); American
Refining Co. v. Staley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 274 S. W. 272 (posted
market price of the Texas Pipeline Company for the same kind and quality
of oil); American Refining Co. v. Sims Oil Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)
282 S. W. 894 (same; parol evidence held admissible to show whether
price23 paid
or received by the Texas Co. was intended).
1
In Turman Oil Co. v. Sapulpa Refining Co., (1926).124 Okla. 150,
254 Pac. 84, the contract was for the sale of oil at the posted market price
on the day the oil should be run, paid by the Prairie Oil & Gas Co. for
"Mid-Continent Crude," plus a premium of 35 cts. per bbl. on account
of quality. For eleven years the Prairie Co. had been posting a single
price without regard to the gravity of the oil. The Prairie Co. changed
its methods and divided Mid-Continent Crude into seven grades, according
23

to gravity, with a separate price for each grade. Buyer and seller agreed

that payment should be made at the price posted by the Prairie Co. for oil
of the same gravity as that supplied, without prejudice to the rights of
either party as to the premium. The court held that the contract terminated
when the Prairie Co. ceased to post a single price; if the parties had had
in contemplation any change to a gravity basis, it would have been written
into the contract. The case was said to be analogous to that of an executory
contract for the sale of goods, providing that the price to be paid should
be fixed by valuers.
This decision has the effect of leaving the seller with the price paid
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ticular grade or package size, from which the prices of other
grades or packages may be determined by the addition or subtraction of a known differential. These differentials may be a
matter of common knowledge among the trade, or they may be
widely advertised or circulated by the seller, or by a group of
sellers; or they may be separately agreed between the parties. In
so far as certainty is concerned, such a contract is not subject to
objection, since the right to make variations within a general description does not invalidate the agreement,2" and the price is
sufficiently certain if it can be determined by computation. 33 The
only obstacle to the enforcement of such a contract lies in the requirement of the statute of frauds, to which reference has been
made above, 234 that wherever a price is actually agreed upon, it
must be stated in the memorandum of the contract.
Where the written agreement provides only that the price is
to be "basis 22.50," or some equivalent phrase, the question before the court is whether the differential which the parties had in
mind may be established by parol evidence. The Pennsylvania
court, in two well considered opinions2 35 has made it clear that
such evidence cannot be introduced unless the differential is
recognized by a general business custom of the particular trade.
If it is so recognized, the contract may be construed in the light
of the custom, and the differential, proved by parol, will be incorporated. 236 But it is not enough that the seller has advertised
by the Prairie Co. for oil of like gravity, without any premium. Quacre,
whether
32 this fairly represented the market value of the oil delivered?

2 Namquit Worsted Co. v. Whitman, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1915) 221 Fed.
49, affirming (D.C.R.I. 1913) 206 Fed. 549.

233J. W. Cherry Co. v. Consolidated Flour Mills Co., (1930)
143 Okla.
99, 287 Pac. 1019; Summit Lumber Co. v. Sheppard, (1912) 102 Ark. 88,
143 S. W. 100. But see Lewis v. Aronow, (Mont. 1976) 251 Pac. 246,
where the price was to be $1.16 per bushel, "subject to terminal weights,
grades and charges." It was held that the contract failed, because the
terminal,
23 4 grading standard, and "charges" were not specified.
See footnotes 16 and 17 and text.
235
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Howell, (1922) 274 Pa. St. 190, 118

Atl. 109; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Kane Milling & Groc. Co., (1923)

278 Pa. St. 105, 122 AtI. 231. In the later case of Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. John, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 104, 123 At. 685, the court referred briefly
to these
23 decisions as the law.
6Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, (1928) 247 N. Y. 465,
160 N. E. 916; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Colvin Atwell & Co., (D.C.
Pa. 1923) 286 Fed. 685; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Egerton, (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1923) 288 Fed. 698; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D.
Mullen Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 885; Namquit Worsted
Co. v. Whitman, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1915) 221 Fed. 49, affirming (D.C.R.I.
1913) 206 Fed. 549; King Collie Co. v. Richards, (1919) 79 Okla. 6, 184
Pac. 130.
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and circulated the differential, or that it is well known to the trade
and to the buyer,237 nor is it sufficient that there is a general usage
in the industry to employ differentials, so long as the particular
figures are not recognized as a matter of custom. 238 Unless such
a custom can be proved, the contract cannot be interpreted in the
light of the differential, and must fail. The harshness of this rule
23 9
is to be attributed to the statute of frauds.
CONCLUSION

In reviewing the various methods by which the price may be
left open in a contract for the sale of goods, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that consistency is not the jewel the courts have
most highly prized. There is seldom any great uniformity in the
decisions dealing with any one type of contract, and the rules as
to the different types cannot reasonably be reconciled. It seems
fair to say that in most cases the parties clearly intend to make
a binding agreement, with the price left open, and the court does
violence to their intention, and injustice to one of them, if the
agreement is defeated. Unless we are to assume that they are unreasonable men, probably the nearest approximation to their actual
intention which the court can offer is a binding agreement at a
reasonable price. In all cases where the price is left open, and a
contrary intention does not clearly appear, such an interpretation
240
is highly desirable.
237

Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Howell, (1922) 274 Pa. St. 190, 118
Atl. 238
109.
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Kane Milling & Groc. Co., (1923)
278 Pa.
St. 105, 122 AtI. 231.
2 39
See footnote 27.
240

Except as to contracts for sale at a price to be fixed by a third

party, the Uniform Sales Act appears to favor such a result.

the Act is set out in footnote 32, and section 10 in footnote 217.
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